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I. Introduction
In the past fifteen years, China has attracted great interest from
the rest of the world. Because of its "open door" policy of
economic reform, China's economy has been developing at an
astonishing rate.' As a result, China's economy has become one of
the world's largest and fastest developing.2 This economic growth
has led to great demand for capital, as well as advanced
technology and management skills. In turn, this demand has
provided great investment opportunities for foreign investors. In
fact, many western multi-national companies have flocked to
China, infusing over $100 billion in foreign direct investment in
I China's annual real GDP growth between 1978 and 1994 averaged about 9%.
See Prepared Testimony of Robert A. Kapp, President of United States-China Business
Council Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., June 6,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Testimony of Robert
A. Kapp]. China's real GDP growth is expected to be about 10% in 1996. See
Josephine Ma, China GDP up 9.8 percent in First Half, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
July 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Ald File. China is ranked by the
International Monetary Fund as the world's third largest economy behind the US and
Japan. See Testimony of Robert A. Kapp, FED. NEWS SERV., June 6, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
2 See ROBERT LLOYD GEORGE, THE HANDBOOK OF EMERGING MARKETS: A
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FASTEST GROWING ECONOMIES 45
(1994).
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1993 alone.3 Consequently, the Chinese securities industry has
emerged as a fairly large, integrated system in a very short time.4
To centralize and control its securities markets, China has
established two national securities exchanges, and many other
regional exchange centers By 1995, all of China's thirty
provinces had companies listed on securities exchanges.6 By
1996, China had 390 companies listed on the Shanghai Exchange
with an aggregate market capitalization of 634.77 billion yuan.'
Private savings have also increased dramatically, reserving a great
supply of capital to further develop the securities market! In
addition, China's securities market has moved towards
internationalization, and China has issued bonds or stocks in
almost all major international securities markets.9
Despite its rapid growth, China's securities industry is still in
an early development stage. In the bond market, the needs of an
efficient capital market conflict with the remains of the old
centrally planned regime." With respect to stock issuance and
trading, the development of stock market represents a major
transformation in China's enterprises.1" Establishing shareholder
3 See id. at 52. In 1995, China was ranked second only to the US in volume of
incoming foreign investment. China also ranks first among developing countries in
attracting foreign direct investment. See Testimony of Robert A. Kapp, supra note 1.
For example, U.S. companies have signed about 16,000 investment contracts worth
roughly $20 billion with China since 1979. See id. China also ranked number one
among the ten most promising emerging markets for US firms. See id.
I See Yi Chen Zhang & Yu Da, China's Emerging Securities Market, 29 COLUM.
J. WLD. Bus. 2, 113 (1994).
5 See id.
6 See All Chinese Provinces to Have Companies Listed with Exchanges, XNHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
7 See China's Stock Market Capitalization Tops 600 Billion Yuan, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, July 15, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews File (The currency
conversion rate for one U.S. dollar was about 8.3 yuan as of November 1996.).
8 See Individual Financial Assets More Diversified, XINHuA NEWS AGENCY, Sept.
23, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. According to official
statistics, by the end of Aug. 1995, individuals held savings of 2,683.39 billion ($323.3
billion) in local currency, and 21 billion in U.S. dollars, about 126 times and 33 times
the 1978 figures respectively. See id.
9 See infra notes 224-38, 405-15 and accompanying text.
10 See Zhang & Da, supra note 4, at 120-2 1.
1 See Deborah Kay Johns, Reforming the State-Enterprise Property Relationship
in the People's Republic of China: the Corporatization of State-Owned Enterprises, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 911 (1995).
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ownership, however, does not mean privatization." Rather, it is a
so-called "corporatization" process, wherein a system of multiple
classes have been established, with the state being majority
shareholder in most instances. 3 In the current stage, at least the
policy of preserving state-ownership, while implementing a stock
holding system, inevitably limits the development of effective
corporations and efficient stock markets. 4 Moreover, the evolving
legal framework for the securities market still reflects, to a large
extent, the mentality associated with the traditional central
planning economy. 5  Quotas and excessive administrative
intervention are prevalent. 6 In addition, the securities market is
plagued by violations of rules, regulatory weakness, and a lack of
disclosure. 7 Market volatility remains a serious problem."
Nevertheless, the government appears to be struggling to
maintain and improve the securities market as part of its economic
reform. 9 More laws and regulations are being promulgated. One
such law, the Company Law (promulgated in 1993 and effective
July 1994) is aimed at establishing and standardizing China's joint
stock companies.2 In addition, a uniform set of rules regarding
shares issued to foreign investors has been established.2 ' The
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the national
regulatory body of the securities market, has recently joined the
12 See id.
'3 See id.
14 See Lan cao, The Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant
Privatization Model 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 97 (1995); see also Andrew Xuefeng Qian,
Riding Two Horses: Incorporating Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory
Regime in China, 12 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L. J. 62 (1993).
I5 See Cao, supra note 14, at 158-59.
16 See infra notes 535-42.
17 See, e.g, infra note 265 and accompanying text.
1 See id.
19 See Regulator Says '97 Will Not Affect HK Stock Market, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 8,
1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
20 See infra notes 21 -22, 32-33, 38, 349 and accompanying text.
21 Company Law of People's Republic of China, translated and annotated in
Guiguo Wang & Roman Tomasic, China's Company Law: An Annotation (1995)
[hereinafter Company Law]; see also Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China
Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J.
INT'L LAW 273 (1995).
22 See infra notes 416-503 and accompanying text.
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International Organization of Securities Commissions. 3 Given its
massive marketplace and capital resources, China could
potentially become one of the most important securities markets in
the world.
This Comment provides an overview of China's securities
markets. Part II of this Comment focuses on the public regulatory
regime and the regulation of securities exchanges. Part III
examines the shareholding system under the new Company Law
and the Interim Regulations on Stock Issuance and Trading. Part
IV is an overview of China's bond market and debt financing
system; both treasury bonds and company bonds are examined,
and the history, regulation, problems, and prospects of the bond
market are analyzed.26  Part V discusses China's basic legal
framework for maintaining orderly markets through mandatory
disclosures and anti-fraud provisions.27 Part VI briefly reviews the
history of foreign investment in China.28 Part VII analyzes the
problems with the legal framework of the shareholding system and
the securities market.2 ' Finally, Part VIII concludes that an
appropriate balance between control and liberalization is critical to
the further development of China's securities market.
II. Regulatory Authorities and Securities Institutions
A. Public Regulatory Authorities
Historically, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), China's
central bank, retained control over the entire securities industry.3"
It was responsible for promulgating and implementing rules and
23 See China Securities Watchdog Joins International Securities Body, CAPITAL
MARKETS REPORT, July 1995, available in WESTLAW, Famews Database.
24 See infra notes 30-67 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 68-145 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 146-317 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 318-404 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 405-503 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 504-69 and accompanying text.
30 See Pitman B. Potter, The Legal Framework for Securities Markets in China:
The Challenge of Maintaining State Control and Inducing Investor Confidence, 7 China
L. Rep. 61, 68-70 (1992).
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regulations for securities.31 Any issuance of stocks and bonds had
to be approved by the PBOC or its local branches.32 The
establishment and operation of securities institutions were also
supervised by the PBOC.33 By 1992, however, it was obvious that
tighter control by an independent agency was necessary.34 As a
result, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) was
established as a broad policy-making body for the securities
industry.35  In essence, the SCSC is a loosely organized
coordinating body36 consisting of officials from various Central
Government ministries and commissions related to securities
issuance and trading.37 Its duties include coordinating various
ministries that issue and trade securities, formulating policies and
guidelines, developing plans, and drafting rules and regulations for
31 See id.
32 See Qiye Zhaiquan Guanli Zhanxing Tiaoli [Interim Regulations on
Administration of Enterprise Bonds] (promulgated by the State Council on Mar. 27,
1987), art. 4, translated in LEXIS, World Library, Chinal File; see also Qiye Zhaiquan
Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations for the Administration of Enterprise Bonds] [hereinafter
Enterprise Bonds Regulation] (promulgated by the State Council on Aug. 2, 1993), art.
11, translated in China: New Regulations for the Issuance of Enterprise Bonds, BBC
MONITORING SERVICES, Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File;
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock
Companies] (Issued on May 15, 1992 by the State Commission on Restructuring the
Economic System), art. 18, translated in Standards for Incorporated Companies, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwid File.
33 Zhengquan Gongsi Guanli Zhanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures on
Administration of Securities Companies] (promulgated by PBOC on Oct. 12, 1990), art.
3.
34 The securities market was chaotic and widespread securities fraud and
government corruption led to a serious riot in Shenzhen, a city with a national securities
exchange. See Riots Erupt Over China Stock Plan, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 11, 1992,
available in WESTLAW, Famews Database.
35 See Fang Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 149, 172-74 (1995). In China, the SCSC is referred to as Zheng Quan Wei.
36 See id. at 174.
37 See id. at 173-74. Such ministries and commissions include (1) the PBOC,
which retains authority to establish securities institutions; (2) the State Planning
Commission, which is responsible for macro-control, developing balanced securities
plans; (3) the Ministry of Finance, which is in charge of accountants and accounting
firms engaged in securities work; (4) the State Commission on Restructuring the
Economic System, the agency that studies and performs experimental enterprises
reform; (5) the State Bureau for the Administration of State Assets; (6) the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce; (7) the State Tax Bureau; (8) the Supreme
Court; and (9) the State Administration for Foreign Currency Control.
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the securities markets. The China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) was formed as the executive arm of the
SCSC to implement the administrative tasks of the SCSC.39 The
CSRC is responsible for enforcing the rules and regulations of the
securities market. 4' The status and scope of authority of the CSRC
were not clearly defined at its origination, but the CSRC has
41gradually gained broad supervisory and regulatory power.
B. Securities Exchanges
To date, China has established an integrated trading system
consisting of two national securities exchanges, two national
electronic trading networks,42 and numerous trading centers in
major cities around the country.43
The Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen
Securities Exchange (SZSE) are the two national securities
exchanges." They were established in 1990 and 1991,
respectively, under local securities regulations promulgated by the
38 See id. at 173; see also Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zhanxing Tiaoli
[Interim Regulations on Management of Stock Issuance and Trading] [hereinafter
Interim Regulations], ch. 1, art. 5 (promulgated by the State Council on Apr. 22, 1993),
translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 19, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
39 See Fang, supra note 35, at 174. In China, the CSRC is referred to as Zheng
Jian Hui.
40 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 5, ch. 7; arts. 68, 69.
41 See Fang, supra note 35, at 174-77. Commentators have even questioned the
constitutionality of the SCSC and CSRC. Fang argued that it is constitutionally
problematic that the SCSC is delegated the power to formulate policy and draft laws,
and that the CSRC, a non-governmental agency, is charged with enormous supervisory
and enforcement power, but is not bound by administrative or judicial review. See id.
But see Xiqing Gao, The Perceived Unreasonable Man-A Response to Fang Liufang, 5
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 271, 279-81 (1995). ("[T]he CSRC is in every other respect
an administrative body," and the non-governmental status is merely a label.)
42 The two electronic trading networks, modeled after the NASDAQ in the U.S.,
are the Securities Trading Automatic Quotations System (STAQ) and the National
Electronic Trading System (NETS). See Zhang & Da, supra note 4, at 113.
43 See id.
" The Shanghai Securities Exchange is referred to by some as the SSE. Shenzhen
is a city across the border from Hong Kong, and was the first Special Economic Zone,
established for experimenting with economic reform in the early 1980s. See Bin Xue
Sang, Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China? An Analysis of the Special
Regulations and Policy for Shanhai's Pudong New Area, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
130-34 (1993).
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municipal governments. 5 In 1993, the SCSC promulgated the
Provisional Measures Governing Stock Exchanges, which
provided uniform national rules for the establishment and
operations of stock exchanges.46 The Provisional Measures did
not, however, provide rules and procedures in great detail. As a
result, several scandals occurred in the securities market. Three
years later, the SCSC issued the Measures for Administration of
Securities Exchanges (Exchange Measures), which repealed the
Provisional Measures and established comprehensive new rules
governing the exchanges.41
Like the old local and national rules, the Exchange Measures
define securities exchanges as non-profit organizations with a
"legal person" status, operating on a self-regulatory membership
system.4 ' An exchange is governed by its members' congress, a
board of directors, and special committees.49  The board of
directors is the decision-making body of the exchange.50 There are
two types of directors: member-directors, who are elected by
members, and non-member directors, who are appointed by
government regulatory agencies.5' Each exchange also has a
supervisory board, subordinate to the board of directors, that is
charged with monitoring and inspecting the financial matters of
45 See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa [Measures of Shanghai
Municipality for Administration of Securities Trading] (promulgated by the Shanghai
Municipal People's Government on Nov. 27, 1990), ch. 5, translated in East Asian
Executive Reports, June 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asianpc Library, Easian File; see
also Interim on Administration of Shenzhen Stock Issuing and Trading, art. 54. For a
detailed discussion on the local securities regulations and securities exchange rules, see
Potter, supra note 30.
46 Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo Guanli Zhanxing Guiding [Provisional Measures
Governing Stock Exchanges], (promulgated by the SCSC on July 7, 1993), translated in
Provisional Measures Governing Stock Exchanges, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, July 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
41 Zhengquan Jiaoyi Suo Guanli Banfa [Measures for Administrative of Securities
Exchange], in ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES NEWSPAPER], Aug. 30,
1996, at 12 [hereinafter Exchange Measures].
48 See id. art. 3. A "legal person" is a term in contrast with the term "natural
person." Under the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, a legal person is an
independent entity legally established which possesses rights and obligations prescribed
by law. See id.
49 See id. art. 16.
50 See id. art. 20.
"' See id. art. 21.
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the exchange. 2 Members of an exchange are officially approved
securities institutions. 3  Members may vote to amend the
exchange charter and to remove or elect directors or supervisory
board members at the members' annual meeting. 4
Compared with the Provisional Measures, governmental
control over securities has significantly increased with the new
regulation. The CSRC is granted enormous control over
exchanges. Under the Provisional Measures, jurisdiction was held
by the local governments and the CSRC possessed only police
power over the exchanges.5 In contrast, the new Measures clearly
provide that securities exchanges are under the supervision of the
CSRC, thereby depriving local governments of most of the
authority over the exchanges. 6
The registration and settlement organizations are also directly
supervised by the CSRC.57 The chairman and vice-chairman of the
board of directors are nominated by the CSRC in consultation with
the local governments before they are elected by the board of
directors. The general manager and deputy general manger of an
exchange must also be nominated by the CSRC in consultation
with the local government.
The rules and procedures for the exchanges operations are
proposed by the exchanges and must be approved by the CSRC.6 °
Along with policy matters, the CSRC can exercise control over the
daily operations of the exchanges. For example, the CSRC can
suspend or resume trading.61 Changes in the number of seats in the
exchange must also be approved by the CSRC.62
In addition to the increased supervision by the CSRC, the
52 See id. art. 26.
53 See id. art. 41.
54 See id. art. 17.
55 See Provisional Measures Governing Stock Exchanges, supra note 46, art. 4.
56 See Exchange Measures, supra note 47, art. 4.
17 See id.
58 See id. art. 22.
19 See id. art. 24.
60 See id. art. 15.
61 See id. art. 35.
62 See id. art. 43.
1997] 565
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Exchange Measures also impose on exchanges more
responsibilities for market administration. 6  Detailed rules and
procedures are provided for exchanges to closely supervise their
members and listed companies." Exchanges may be sanctioned,
not only for their own violations of securities regulations, but also
for the failure to enforce the rules against their members and listed
companies." Moreover, the Exchange Measures also add a
chapter regarding securities registration and settlement
66institutions. Exchanges are required to establish such institutions
and follow the rules provided.67
III. Stock Companies and Stock Issuance
A. Stock Companies
China's Company Law allows for two types of stock
companies: the limited liability company and the joint stock
company.6' Limited liability companies resemble closely held
corporations in the United States in that they have a limited
number of shareholders and the shares are not freely transferable.69
A limited liability company can have between two and fifty
shareholders." While shares may be freely transferred among the
existing shareholders,7' approval must be obtained from more than
one half of the existing shareholders in order to transfer shares to
an outsider.7" In addition, the existing shareholders have the right
of first refusal to purchase the stock.73 In the event that a transfer
is not approved, the existing shareholders who voted against the
63 See id. chs. 5, 6, 7.
64 See id.
65 See id arts. 91-9.
66 See id. ch. 8.
67 See id.
68 For a detailed discussion of the Company Law, see generally Company Law,
supra note 21; see also Art & Gu, supra note 21.
69 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 20.
70 See id. A limited liability company may not have only one shareholder, unless it
is a wholly state-owned company. See id.
71 See id. art. 35.
72 See id.
73 See id.
566 [Vol. 22
SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA
transfer must purchase the shares.74  Thus, limited liability
companies do not participate in China's securities markets since
their shares are not freely transferable. For these shares to be
publicly traded on stock exchanges, they must be transformed into
joint stock companies which requires, among other things,
approval of shareholders representing at least two-thirds of the
71
voting rights of the company.
A special form of the limited liability company is the wholly
state-owned company, which may be established by a state
investment institution or a government agency.76 In such a
company, the function of the shareholder meetings is shared by the
investment institution or the government agency and the board of
directors appointed by them, and the state is the sole shareholder
of the company.77 In certain areas of trade and industry, only
wholly state-owned companies are permitted.7' The rationale for
this may be to retain exclusive state control in state-owned
enterprises while incorporating the enterprises and allowing their
management to be more independent.
A joint stock company is the company form required to issue
shares to the public. 79 A joint stock company may be established,
upon approval of relevant government agencies, by at least five
promoters who may be either natural or legal persons. 0 The
promoters may purchase all the shares (Faqi Sheli) or issue some
shares to the public (Muji Sheli). s1 The Company Law requires a
minimum capital investment of ten million yuan ($1.1 5 million).82
A joint stock company is governed by shareholders, a board of
directors, a supervisory board, and the executive management."
74 See id.
71 See id. arts. 39, 98-100.
76 See id. art. 64.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 7.
80 See Company Law, supra note 21, arts. 75, 77. When setting up a joint stock
company by transforming an existing state-owned company, it is allowed to have less
than five promoters, but public offering is required. See id. art. 75.
S1 See id. art. 74.
82 See id. art. 78.
83 See id. arts. 102-28.
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The supervisory board's function is to inspect and monitor the
books and records of the company, to police the actions of the
directors and management, and to enforce regulations when
improper acts are discovered.8 4 Shareholders, like their U.S.
counterparts, enjoy broad rights.85
Several procedural flaws, however, may lead to infringement
of the rights of shareholders. The process of shareholder voting
can lead to problems. Individual notice of a shareholders meeting
is not required for shareholders with bearer shares, which is the
form of the shares issued to the public. 86 To attend shareholder's
meetings, bearer shareholders must deposit their shares with the
issuing company five days before the meeting.87 In addition,
because a quorum is not required,88 a small number of shareholders
can make decisions at shareholder meetings. Cumulative voting is
not allowed by the Company Law.89 Because the shares issued to
the public are often minority shares,9" the public may not be
adequately protected by the Company Law.91  Although
shareholders may sue in court for the violation of their legal
rights,92 no derivative actions are allowed.
Another defect of the Company Law concerns inspection.
Even though the Company Law provides that shareholders have
rights to inspect corporate records, question the management, and
84 See id. art. 126.
85 See id. arts. 103, 110-11, 143. Shareholder rights include voting in the
shareholders meeting on matters prescribed by the company charter, transferring shares
in the securities exchanges, inspecting company records, and filing suits in the courts
against the company for violation of shareholder rights. See id.
86 "Bearer shares" refers to shares that are issued to the public and the company's
records do not have the shareholders' names. See id. art. 105. Constructive notice, such
as public announcement, suffices for bearer shares. See id. Moreover, the Company Law
does not specify where the constructive notice may be published. See id.
87 Shares issued to the public may take either bearer or registered form, whereas
shares issued to the promoters, legal persons or state-authorized investment institutions
must be registered. See id. art. 133.
88 See id. arts. 106-07. There is no requirement for a minimum number of shares
represented in the meeting. See id.
89 See Company Law, supra note 21.
90 See Fang, supra note 35, at 216.
91 See Note, "Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing: Questions of
Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REv. 503, 542 (1995).
92 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 111.
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make suggestions, 93 the procedures for such acts are not specified.
Given that most joint stock companies are transformed from large
state enterprises with company officials accustomed to the old
ways of managing their companies, it is doubtful that shareholders
can effectively exercise such rights. In addition, no rule is
provided to enable the proposals of public shareholders to be
included in the agenda of shareholder meetings.
B. Stock Issuance
Until the State Council promulgated the Interim Regulations
on Management of Stock Issuance and Trading (Interim
Regulations) in 1993, stock issuance and trading was conducted
under disparate regional regulations. 94  The Interim Regulations
reconciled the differences between the local rules and unified the
two stock exchanges and the securities exchange centers around
the country.95 The Company Law, in its pertinent chapters,
modifies and codifies some provisions of the Interim Regulations,
and provides the national legal framework for further legislation
on securities markets.96
The Company Law defines "stock" as a certificate issued by a
joint stock company to shareholders that certifies the shares of the
company they hold.97 The capital of a joint stock company is
divided into equal shares.98 This means that all shares issued at the
same time should be priced the same and should contain the same
rights and benefits.9 9 Stock issued may not be priced lower than its
93 See id. art. 110.
94 The local regulations include the Shanghai Securities Transaction Regulations,
the Tentative Procedures for Stock Issuance and Trading Administration in Shenzhen,
the Trial Regulations of the Shanghai Securities Exchange on the Activities of the
Exchange Market, and the Articles of Association for the Shenzhen Securities Exchange.
See Qian, supra note 14, at 86-89; see also Benjamin R. Tarbutton, China-A National
Regulatory Framework for the PRC's Stock Markets Begins to Emerge, 24 GA. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 411,413-20 (1994); Potter, supra note 30, at 72-77.
95 For a comparison between the local rules and the Interim Regulations, see
Tarbutton, supra note 94.
96 See generally Art & Gu, supra note 21.
97 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 129.
98 See id.
99 See id. art. 130.
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"par value.""' Shares issued to the promoters, legal persons, and
state-authorized investment institutions must be registered,
whereas the shares issued to the public may be in either registered
or bearer form.'
Interestingly, Chinese stock may be offered in several different
types. 2 This reflects the dilemma posed by creating a stock
system, while maintaining traditional state-ownership of
companies."' The state shares (Guojia Gu) of a joint stock
company represent the assets of the previous state enterprise that
was transformed into the joint stock company, or the shares held
by government agencies.0 4  Usually, state shares are common
stock held by the central or local State Asset Administration
Bureau, a special commission established for the purpose of
managing state assets.0 5 Conversion of state shares is restricted 6
10 See id. art. 131.
1"I See id. art. 133. B shares (shares issued in China but reserved for foreigners)
and A shares (regular shares issued to Chinese investors) issued by companies which
have issued B shares must, however, be in registered form. Guo Wu Yuan Guanyu
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Jingnei Shangshi Waizi Gu de Guiding, [State Council
Provisions on Listing of Foreign Investment Shares Inside China by a Joint Stock
Company], (promulgated by the State Council on Dec. 25, 1995), art. 3, available in
People's Daily, (Overseas Ed.), Jan. 4, 1996, p. 2, translated in 3 CHINA L. & PRAc. 19,
19 (1996) [hereinafter B Share Provisions]; see also infra notes 435-36 and
accompanying text.
102 See Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock Companies, supra note 32.
103 See Qian, supra note 14.
104 See Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock Companies, supra note 32,
ch. 3, arts. 22, 24; Fang, supra note 35, at 202-03.
115 See Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock Companies, supra note 32,
ch. 3, arts. 22, 24; Fang, supra note 35, at 229.
106 See Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock Companies, supra note 32,
ch. 3, art. 30; see also Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 36. Both regulations
provide state share transfer must be approved by relevant government departments
according to separate rules. There is, however, no specific rule published for reference,
and it is unclear which government agency has authority over the transfer. See, e.g.,
Fang, supra note 35, at 232-34. In order to solve its cash flow crisis, the shareholders
meeting of Harbin Pharmaceutical, a joint stock company converted from a state
enterprise, approved the plan to transfer 52 million state shares to individual
shareholders at a below market price. The CSRC tried to block the transfer contending
inter alia that appropriate government agency approval from the State Asset
Administration Bureau was not obtained. The company asserted that it was authorized
by both the provincial and municipal government, and eventually succeeded in the
transfer. But see Company Law, supra note 21, art. 148. (State-authorized investment
institution, presumably holding state shares or legal person shares, may transfer its
holdings according to law.)
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and such shares are not traded on the open markets. 7 The legal
person shares (C Shares) are shares of one joint stock company
owned by another company or institution with a legal person
status."8 The legal person shares can be indirectly owned by the
state if the shareholders are state-owned or state-controlled
companies or agencies."9 Transfer and trading of legal person
shares is also restricted." The individual shares (A Shares) are
those subscribed to by individual domestic investors and are freely
traded on the stock exchanges."' The special shares (B Shares) are
shares listed on the two exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen and
are reserved solely for foreigners and Chinese citizens overseas."'
To attract foreign investment, selected Chinese companies can list
their shares directly on international markets."' H Shares are the
shares of Chinese companies listed in the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, and N Shares are the stocks of those listed in the United
States." 4  In addition, China is also planning to issue shares in
other major international markets such as Tokyo and London."5
1. Establish a Joint Stock Company through Issuing
Shares to the Public
The minimum registered capital required for a joint stock
company is 10 million yuan ($1.15 million)."6 The promoters may
107 See Qian, supra note 14, at 92.
108 See Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock Companies, supra note 32,
ch. 3, arts. 22, 24.
109 See Fang, supra note 35, at 204.
110 See id. at 208-10; Qian, supra note 14, at 92. While the Interim Regulations on
Management of Stock Issuance and Trading limits transfer of state shares, it is silent on
the transferability of legal person shares. See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 36.
In practice, legal person shares are frequently traded among public organizations. See
Fang, supra note 35, at 212. Often the transfer is done through negotiated agreements
between legal person shareholders. See Zhang Jie, Stock Transfer Disputed, SHANGHAI
STAR, June 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
I See Fang, supra note 35, at 212.
112 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 4; see also infra notes 431-32 and
accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 472-84 and accompanying text.
114 See id.
115 See infra notes 479-84 and accompanying text.
116 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 78.
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purchase all the shares of the company (Faqi Sheli)."7 To establish
a joint stock company by issuing shares to the public (Muji Sheli),
the promoters must purchase at least thirty five percent of all
shares."' The Company Law for the first time allows individuals
and private enterprises to act as promoters."9  The Interim
Regulations also require that promoters have not violated any laws
or regulations in the preceding three years. 120 In addition, because
most joint stock companies are established by converting existing
state-owned enterprises, the Interim Regulations require the
enterprise to meet certain net capital requirements and to have
been profitable for the preceding consecutive three years. 2'
Unlike the securities registration process in the United States,
China has adopted an application and approval approach.
Consistent with its tradition of centralized government control and
central planning, a quota system has been established.' Initially,
the SCSC and the State Planning Commission, with approval from
the State Council, jointly set a fixed amount of stock to be issued
during the year.'23 The two departments allocate the issuance
quota to the provincial level local governments and ministries. 124
The local governments and ministries allocate the quota among the
enterprises under their direct control.2 5  Without a quota, a joint
117 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 74.
118 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 8(3); Company Law, supra note 21,
arts. 74, 83, 147.
The promoters may purchase shares with tangible as well as intangible capital
such as patent and technology, but they may not exceed 20 percent of the total assets of
the company. See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 80. The Interim Regulations also
require that the portion issued to the public not be less than 25 percent of the total
issuance, and that the shares issued to the employees of the company not be more than
ten percent of the total shares issued to the public. See Interim Regulations, supra note
38, art. 8.
119 See Fang, supra note 35, at 258.
120 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 8.
121 See id. art. 9.
122 See Fang, supra note 35, at 178-86; see also Interim Regulations, supra note 38,
art. 12(2).
123 See Fang, supra note 35, at 180.
124 See id. In China, a business enterprise is generally controlled by either a local
government (hence the term "local enterprise"), or by the ministry of the central
government that has primary responsibility for the company's primary line of business
(hence the characterization as a "central enterprise"). See id.
125 See id.
572 [Vol. 22
SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA
stock company cannot be established by issuing shares to the
public. 26 Even when a quota is obtained, an enterprise must go
through a long and complex application and approval process.17
Essentially, an applicant must obtain documents regarding asset
evaluation, auditing reports, and legal opinions before it submits
its application to its supervisory ministry or local government,
which then makes a decision. 28 The ministry or local government
must also submit its subordinate enterprise's application, together
with its decision, to the SCSC and CSRC 29 The approved
application is then re-examined by the CSRC 3 °  After the
application is approved by the CSRC, the applicant must apply to
a national securities exchange to list its shares. 31 Thus, even with
the blessing of the CSRC, the applicant cannot list shares on the
exchange or issue shares to the public without the exchange's
approval. 32  The Interim Regulations also provide lists of
documents required in the applications.'
2. Secondary Offerings to the Public
In order to protect investor interests, the following conditions
-must be met before secondary offerings to the public are
authorized: (1) the previous offering must have been successful;
(2) the interval between the two offerings must have been more
than one year; (3) the corporation must have been profitable for
the past three years; (4) the company must have been able to pay
dividends to its shareholders; (5) there were no falsifications or
fraud in its book records or reports; and (6) the expected
profitability is at least the same as the savings deposit rate. 34 In
addition, the proceeds from the previous public issuance must
126 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 12(2).
127 See Fang, supra note 35, 178-86; Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 12;
but see Gao, supra note 41, at 282.
128 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 12(1), (2).
129 See id. art. 12(2).
130 See id. art. 12(3).
131 See id.
132 See Id.; see also Gao, supra note 41 at 282. According to Gao, the purpose of
this restriction is to minimize black market trading. See id.
133 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, arts. 13-14.
134 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 137.
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have been used in accordance with the prospectus. 35 The class,
amount, and price of stocks to be issued, and the timing of the
issue, are decided at a shareholders meeting. 136 The board of
directors must apply for approval from the supervisory department
in its trade area or from the provincial government.37 Final
approval must also be obtained from the CSRC' 38
3. Listing in Securities Exchanges
In order to maintain investor confidence and to stabilize the
two fledgling securities exchanges, the Company Law mandates
that a joint stock company seeking to be listed on the two
exchanges must meet certain conditions. 39 It must have already
issued more than twenty five percent of its total shares to the
public, 14 with no less than 1000 shareholders who hold more than
1000 yuan ($115 million) worth of stock.' 4' The total value of its
issued stock has to be at least 50 million yuan ($6 million).' 2 In
addition, it must have been operating profitably for at least three
years.'43 Lastly, the company must not have violated any laws or
regulations in the previous three years, or committed fraud or
falsification in its book records or reports.'" The company must
apply for approval from both the CSRC and the securities
exchange in which it seeks to be listed. 145 These requirements limit
135 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 11 (a). Yet this is often violated by
the listed companies. See Sophie Roell, What Does the Future Hold for B and H
Shares?, 10 CHINA L. & PRAC. 17, 17 (1996).
136 See Company Law, supra note 2 1, art. 13 8.
131 See id. art. 139; Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 12.
138 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 12(3).
131 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 152.
140 See id. art. 152. Where the total stock issued is worth more than four hundred
million yuan ($46 million), a lower portion of fifteen percent may suffice. See id. This
rule conflicts with the Interim Regulations requirement for issuing shares to the public,
which mandates that at least 25 percent of the shares be issued to the public. See supra
note 118.
141 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 152. The distribution requirement may
help to avoid over-concentration of stocks in very few shareholders, and to prevent
market manipulation.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
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the ability of small and medium companies to raise capital and
reflect the government's cautious approach to the securities
market.
IV. Bonds and Debt Financing
A. Bonds Primary Market
1. An Overview
Debt financing is not new in China. Bonds appeared in China
as early as the end of the nineteenth century.' 4 Beginning in 1867,
the Qing Imperial government repeatedly issued large quantities of
bonds to foreign investors. 14'7 These funds were used to finance the
Chinese government's industrialization, a western style army, and
the construction of railways.1
41
Shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of
China, government bonds were issued on several occasions in the
1950s to raise funds from individual citizens. 49  By the end of
1968, however, all bonds were repaid.5 It was only after Deng
Xiaoping's reform policy took effect that China began to issue
146 See Mingjia Ma, Zhongguo de Zhengquan Shichang [The Chinese Securities
Markets] 3-4 (1993).
141 See id.
148 See id. The well publicized case of Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794
F.2d 1490 (1 1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987), was derived from one of
these issues. In 1979, holders of the "Hukuang Bonds" issued in 1911 by the Imperial
Government of China to finance the construction of the Hukuang Railroad filed a class
action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the current
Chinese government, seeking repayment on the bonds that were allegedly at default. See
id. at 1491-92. Upon the Chinese government's refusal to appear in court, the district
court entered a default judgment. See id. at 1492. The Chinese government then
reopened the case and successfully had the case dismissed based on the argument that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not apply retroactively to confer
subject matter jurisdiction upon transactions occurring prior to 1952. See id. China
eventually settled various similar claims with different countries and thus removed a
major obstacle for China's issuing bonds in the international securities market. See
generally China, Britain Settle Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1987, at D9 (discussing the
resolution of several outstanding claims against the Chinese government related to bond
indebtedness); Theroux & Peele, China & Sovereign Immunity: The Huguang Railways
Bonds Case, 2 CHINA L. REP. 129 (1982-83).
49 See China Issues Treasury Bonds, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 8, 1981,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
150 See id.
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bonds again."'
Unlike equity financing, bond financing does not affect state
autonomy and public ownership because it does not require the
issuer to do more than pay back the principal and interest.52
Therefore, it is natural that bonds appeared before stocks in China
after the adoption of the economic reform policy.'53 The first bond
issued under this new policy was the 1981 treasury bond that
generated funds to fight inflation and reduce the deficit.'54 Since
then, China's debt financing has developed substantially.
Treasury bonds have been the most dominant component of
China's debt financing.'55 The amount has increased from 4.6
billion yuan ($550 million) in 1981156 to 195.2 billion yuan ($23.52
billion) in 1996.' Beginning in 1985, banks and other financial
institutions issued financial bonds to fund important state
projects. 5 8  Enterprises can also issue enterprise bonds to the
public. 9 In addition, bonds have been issued abroad by the state,
financial banks, and enterprises to raise much-needed foreign
capital for economic development.'60
151 See id.
152 See Potter, supra note 30, at 62.
153 See id.
154 See China Issues Treasury Bonds, supra note 149.
155 See Zhang & Yu, supra note 4, at 116. (Treasury bonds accounted for 282
billion yuan out of the 544 billion yuan of all bonds issued between 1981 and 1993.)
156 See Purchases of China's Treasury Bonds 16.6 Percent Above Quota, THE
XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, July 14, 1981, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Xinhua File.
157 See Graham Earnshaw, China 1996 State Debt Top Seller, Needs More Reform,
REUTERS ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS REPORT, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File.
15 See China Banks Help Economy, XNHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 25, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; Bonds Will Help Non-
ferrous Metal Enterprises, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 5, 1987, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; see also Shanghai Issues Saving Bonds, XINH-uA
NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 25, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
159 See Qiye Zhaiquan Guanli Zhanxing Tiaoli [Interim Regulations On
Administration Of Enterprise Bonds] (Issued by the State Council on Mar. 27, 1987)
translated in LEXIS, World Library, Chinal File; Qiye Zhaiquan Guanli Tiaoli
[Regulations On Administration Of Enterprise Bonds] (Issued by the State Council on
Mar. 27, 1987) translated in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File; see also Company
Law, supra note 21, ch. 5.
160 See China: Where the Bonds Are Being Made and Broken, Bus. CHINA, May 2,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Eiubc File. China has already floated
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2. Treasury Bonds
The revenue from issuing treasury bonds is used to balance the
state budget deficit, pay foreign debt, and fund key state
projects. 61 In addition, it is intended to be a means to collect funds
from local governments and enterprises in a way that China's
nascent tax system failed to do. 62 Every year, the State Council
decides the amount of treasury bonds that will be issued and
promulgates a regulation announcing, among other terms, to which
investors the bonds are to be distributed and their interest rates.
63
The Finance Ministry is authorized to interpret the regulation and
is the issuer of the treasury bonds.' 64 The PBOC is responsible for
coordinating the issuance and repayment of the treasury bonds.
61
Before 1989, treasury bonds were issued to individuals as well
as organizations such as state and collective enterprises, state
government agencies, local governments, schools, and army
units. 66 The annual interest rates were decided by the government.
Individual holders experienced substantially higher rates than
organization purchasers.167  Since 1989, however, treasury bonds
have only been issued to individuals. 1
68
The maturity date for the treasury bonds issued from 1981 to
Japanese Yen bonds, European bonds, Dragon bonds, and'Yankee bonds. See id.
161 See Ministry of Finance Official on the Role and Allocation of Treasury Bonds,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 28, 1986, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.
162 See China Issues Treasury Bonds, supra note 149.
163 See, e.g., State Council Regulations on Treasury Bonds for 1982, translated in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 3, 1982, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File [hereinafter State Council Regulations].
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See, e.g., id. (discussing Article 2 of the regulations); see also Regulations on
Floating 1984 Treasury Bonds, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 12, 1984,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
167 For example, from 1982 to 1984, the rates for individual purchasers were 8%
and those for organizations 4%. See State Council Regulations, supra note 163, art 4.
168 See China To Issue Treasury Bonds And Special State Bonds, XINHUA GENERAL
OVERSEAS SERVICE, June 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File;
China, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1994, available in World Library, Allwld File. Those for
organizations were issued as special state bonds and the issuance was eventually
terminated in 1994. See New State Treasury Bond Issue Announced, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, May 17, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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1984 was ten years.169 Twenty percent of the bonds were paid each
year, starting at the sixth year, by randomly selecting identification
numbers on the bond certificates through a lottery. 7° Interest was
paid with principal at the time of repayment. 7' The distribution of
the treasury bonds was conducted by quota assignment and
compulsory allocation.7 2  In practice, this was achieved through
mandatory payroll deductions for individuals and bank account
withholdings for enterprises.' Retail channels for bond
distributions to voluntary individuals were limited to counters set
up by a few banks. Treasury bonds, however, were not negotiable
and could not be transferred or traded.
7 4
Treasury bonds were very unpopular because the public was
unfamiliar with the concept of securities. Furthermore, the
inflation rate was high and the bonds were not allowed to be
traded. Consequently, the demand was considerably low and the
government had to use propaganda to encourage individuals and
organizations to fulfill the quotas assigned to them. 7 ' Thus, over
the years, a series of adjustment measures have been adopted by
the government to stimulate the public's interest in treasury bonds.
For instance, their maturity dates were shortened and their
variety was increased. In 1985, their maturity dates were reduced
from ten to five years.'76 They were further reduced to three years
in 1988.' In 1994, treasury bonds with a maturity date of six-
169 See, e.g., Regulations on Floating 1984 Treasury Bonds, supra note 166.
170 See id. (discussing Article 6 of the regulations). For organization holders, no lot
need be drawn. See id.
171 See id.
172 See China Issues Treasury Bonds, supra note 149. The quota was fixed by the
Finance Ministry for allocation to local governments, which in turn assigned them to
organizations and enterprises. See ZHANG & Yu, supra note 4, at 116.
173 See ZHANG & YU, supra note 4, at 116.
174 See Regulations on Floating 1984 Treasury Bonds, supra note 166 (discussing
Article 9 of the regulations).
175 See Ministry of Finance Official on the Role and Allocation of Treasury Bonds,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 28, 1986, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.
176 See State Council Regulations on 1985 Treasury Bonds, art. 6, translated in
Regulations on 1995 Treasury Bonds, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 2,
1985, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
177 See Sweeter Pot for Bond Holders in China, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 11, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
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months, one-year, two-years, and three-years were issued.17 1 In
1995, in addition to the one-year paperless bond, 179 two types of
three-year treasury bonds were issued: non-tradable certificate
bonds with an inflation-linked interest rate; and three-year
unregistered bonds that are not inflation-adjusted and can be
traded.' Even bonds with long maturity dates can be redeemed
after a very short period of holding. 8' With shortened maturity
dates, bond holders did not worry that inflation would reduce the
value of the treasury bonds.
Still other ways to stimulate interest included opening and
expanding secondary markets in 1988, and allowing the bonds
issued in 1985 and 1986 to individuals to be traded in the
markets. 82  In 1994, to offset inflation, a system of paying a
subsidy on top of the interest rate was established. 3 After the
establishment of securities institutions, bond distribution became a
responsibility of these entities and, as a result, became more
efficient. In 1991, a syndicate of securities dealers was, for the
first time, organized to underwrite the treasury bonds. 8 4 Although
the Ministry of Finance had to revert to the compulsory
distribution method in 1993 because of the unpopularity of
treasury bonds, it re-established an underwriting syndicate to issue
the 1994 treasury bonds.8 5 Following these adjustments, the bond
178 See ZHANG & Yu, supra note 4, at 115.
179 Paperless bond is also called electronic bond because it is transferred
electronically and paper printing is not required.
180 See China Short-Term Bond Issue Exceeds Planned Target, AGENCY FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
181 For example, the three-year bonds issued in 1994 could be cashed six months
after the date of issuance. See China "s Bond Markets Come of Age: From Forced Sales
to Feeding Frenzy, Bus. CHINA, July 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
182 See Treasury Bond Transaction To Be Expanded, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS
NEWS SERVICE, May 31, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
183 See Draft China Bond Law to Tackle Irregularities, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The monthly inflation subsidy on top
of existing interest rates was introduced in March 1994. See id. This subsidy was
adjusted regularly by the government and ran as high as 10.38% in February 1995. See
China State Bond Futures Turnover Rockets in 1994, REUTERS, Jan. 21, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
184 See ZHANG & Yu, supra note 4, at 116.
185 See id. at 116-17. The members of the syndicate organized by the PBOC were
securities institutions designated jointly by the Ministry of Finance, the PBOC, and the
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issuance was a great success in part because of the depression of
the stock market. In fact, by 1994 the demand for treasury bonds
was so great that the government had to issue more bonds than
originally planned. 1
8 6
3. Company Bonds
Unlike equity financing, debt financing does not require the
conversion of an existing enterprise into a stock company.18
Moreover, company bonds have been good investments for the
public because they are repaid relatively quickly with high interest
rates.'88 Thus, because most Chinese stock companies only came
in to existence in the early 1990s, and most enterprises are state
enterprises, it seems natural that issuing bonds would be a more
popular avenue for raising funds than stock issuance.
Yet, equity financing was utilized far more frequently in the
past."9 There are several reasons for this. First, the financial
burden of having to repay debt in a short period may have deterred
fund-desperate Chinese enterprises. Issuing bonds increases a
company's debt rate. Most state enterprises have already incurred
large amounts of debt owed to the central government and banks
under the old credit edict system. 9  In 1993, the central
government adopted an austerity program to curb soaring inflation
and thus has applied strict controls on company bond issues.' On
the other hand, stock issuance does not give rise to short-term debt
liabilities. At present, stock issuing in China does not impose
enough obligation on the part of company management to the
shareholders so as to make debt financing an attractive
CSRC. See id. at 117.
186 See China 's Bond Markets Come ofAge, supra note 181.
187 The Regulations on Administration of Enterprise Bonds apply to bonds issued
by any enterprises within the territory of China having a legal person status. See
Regulations on Administration of Enterprise Bonds, supra note 32, art. 2.
188 See Corporate Bond Issue A Great Success, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 7,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexus Library, Cumws File.
189 See China Bond Issues Set to Double, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. During the past five years, 370
billion yuan of treasury bonds were issued, while 64 billion yuan worth of corporate
bonds were sold. See id.
190 See id. Enterprises' debt rate are more than 85 percent at present. See id.
'9' See id; see also Roell, supra note 135.
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alternative.192 In addition, the stock market is better known in
China and is thought to bring companies better reputations.
Nevertheless, while government bonds were extremely
unpopular in their early years, enterprises have enjoyed some
recent success in raising funds by bond issuance.' 93  So far,
company bonds have been very popular among individual
investors and are increasingly utilized as an alternative instrument
for enterprises to raise urgently-needed capital.' 94
In 1987, the State Council for the first time issued provisional
regulations that clarified the requirements and procedures for
issuing bonds by enterprises.' 95 The provisional regulations were
codified by the State Council's Regulations on the Administration
of Enterprise Bonds. 96 In addition, the Company Law allows for
the issuance of bonds as a means of raising capital. 9 7  The
Regulations-issued before the Company Law, which only applies
to limited liability companies and joint stock companies' 9-- apply
to Chinese enterprises with a legal person status. 99 Thus, stock
companies organized under the Company Law would have to
follow the stricter requirements of the Company Law.200
Company bonds are defined as negotiable securities lawfully
192 See Michael I. Nikkel, "Chinese Characteristics" in Corporate Clothing:
Questions of Fiduciary Duty in China's Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REv. 503 (1995).
193 For example, in contrast to the forcible sale of treasury bonds, citizens lined up
to buy enterprises bonds at issuance. See, e.g., Bonds Sold in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 1986, at 48.
194 See China Bond Issues Set to Double, supra note 189. The Beijing Chemical
Industry Group Corporation issued new bonds in January 1995. See id. Local residents
formed long lines to purchase the bonds. See id.
195 See Notice on Further Strengthening the Administration of Stocks and Bonds,
(Issued by the State Council on Mar. 28, 1987), translated in State Council Circular on
Supervision of Stocks and Bonds, BCC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May 6,
1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter State Council
Notice]; Interim Regulations on Administration of Enterprise Bonds, supra note 32. For
a detailed discussion on the notice and the regulation, see Henry R. Zheng, Securities
Regulation in China: Development and Conflicts, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., May 15,
1987, available in LEXIS, Asianpc Library, Easian File.
196 Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32.
197 See Company Law, supra note 21, ch. 5.
19 See id. art. 2.
19 See Enterprise Bonds Regulations , supra note 32, art 2.
200 For convenience, I refer to both the bonds issued by stock companies and
enterprises that are not stock companies as generally "company bonds."
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issued by a company with the principal and interest repayable
within a certain time period."' Bond holders have no rights or
obligations with respect to the management of the enterprise."2
Company bonds are transferable, tradable, and may be inherited. 3
For both joint and limited stock companies, the decision to
issue bonds is made by the board of directors and must be
approved by a majority of shareholders at the shareholders'
meeting. 4 In the case of a wholly state-owned limited liability
stock company, the decision is made by the state agency in charge
of that company's trade or industry.0 5 Like stock issuance, a quota
system, as well as an application and approval process, are used in
bond issuance.0 6 The Regulations specify that a quota is assigned
annually by the State Planning Commission, in coordination with
the PBOC, the Finance Ministry, and the SCSC, to the provincial
level local governments and ministries responsible for different
trades or industries. 7 Under the Regulations, the approval of the
PBOC and the State Planning Commission or their local branches
must be obtained before enterprise bonds can be issued.0 8 Under
the Company Law, however, the examination and approval
authority rests with the SCSC for the issuance of bonds by stock
companies."' Both the Company Law and the Regulations provide
lists of documents required to be submitted for examination and
approval."
To issue company bonds, a joint stock company or an eligible
limited liability company must have net assets of more than thirty
million yuan ($3.6 million) and 60 million yuan ($7.2 million),
respectively." The total value of the bonds issued by a stock
201 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 160; Regulation on Administration
Enterprise Bonds, supra note 32, art. 5.
202 See Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32, art. 7.
203 See id. art. 8; Company Law, supra note 21, arts. 170-71.
204 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 163.
205 See id.
206 See id. arts. 163-65; Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32, arts. 10-11.
207 See Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32, art. 11.
208 See id. art. 16.
209 See Company Law, supra note 21, arts. 163-64.
210 See id. arts. 165-66; Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32, art. 14.
211 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 161
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company may not exceed forty percent of its net assets." These
requirements are more stringent than the Regulations, which are
silent on the minimum net asset requirement and only require that
the bonds issued do not exceed the net assets of the issuing
enterprise. 3  In order to ensure repayment to investors, the
Company Law mandates that in the three consecutive years
preceding the issuance, a stock company must have average annual
earnings and profits high enough to pay one year's interest on the
bonds to be issued. 14  The Regulations, however, only require
three consecutive profitable years immediately before the
application. 15 Both the Company Law and the Regulations
prohibit bonds with interest rates that are more than forty percent
above the bank savings deposit rate.16 The funds raised through
issuing bonds must be used according to the state industrial
policies. 7 They may not be used for the production of passive
income production through real estate, stock, or commodities
investment, or other risky investments that are irrelevant to the
trade or business of the issuing company.' Finally, bonds can be
traded only in approved markets.1 9
Because the legal framework is in place, the Company Law
permits qualified stock companies to issue bonds that are
convertible to stocks.2 In order to do so, the issuing company
212 See id.
213 See Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32, art. 16.
214 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 161.
215 See Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra note 32, art. 12.
216 See id. art. 18; Company Law, supra note 21, art. 161.
217 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 161; Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra
note 32, art. 12.
218 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 161; Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra
note 32, art. 20.
219 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 170; Enterprise Bonds Regulations, supra
note 32, art. 22.
220 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 172; see, e.g., China Floats Convertible
Bonds in Switzerland, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 18, 1995, available in LEXIS News
Library, Xinhua File (reporting a Chinese joint stock company, China Nanbo Group, Co.
Ltd. floated, in Switzerland, $45 million-worth of bonds convertible into B shares).
China has been cautious in experimenting with convertible bonds for fund raising, and
most of the few issues in the past failed. See China Plans Program for Convertible
Bonds, ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File; Graham Eamshaw, China Progress on Convertible Bonds Seen
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must be qualified to issue stocks22' and must have its stocks listed
on one of the securities exchanges.222 A convertible bond holder
has the right to choose whether or not to convert the bonds.223
4. International Bonds Markets
The issuance of foreign-currency-denominated overseas bonds
by entities other than the government is strictly controlled. Under
a directive issued by the State Council in 1989, such issues must
follow the state plan.224 Required documents must be submitted to
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control ("SAFEC")
for examination, and approval must be subsequently obtained from
the PBOC.225 After a bond rating is obtained, the issuer must
report the rating to SAFEC and the PBOC, and the PBOC has the
right to block the issuance if the rating is poor.226 Only ten entities
are designated to regularly issue bonds abroad, including two
special banks, the China International Trust and Investment
Company ("CITIC"), which is China's major international
investment and borrowing institution, and CITIC's eight local
branches. 7 Other entities may apply to the PBOC and SAFEC on
Next Year, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Aliwld File
(commenting on the failure of the China Textile Machinery's issue of convertible bonds
and noting that, nevertheless, securities officials have indicated that this year the
government would approve a selected list of enterprises for convertible-bond issues,
aiming at diversifying financing channels for China's companies).
21 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 172.
222 See id.
223 See id. art. 173.
224 See also Circular for Strengthening the Control of Borrowing International
Commercial Loans (promulgated by the State Council on Jan. 12, 1989), art. 3,
translated in LEXIS, World Library, Chinal File.
225 See Guanyu Zhongguo Jingnei Jigou Zai Jingwai Faxing Zhaiquan de Guanli
Guiding [Regulations Governing Bond Issues Abroad by Resident Institutions in China]
(promulgated on Sept. 18, 1987, by the People's Bank of China), arts. 3-4, translated in
LEXIS, World Library, Chinal File; Circular for Strengthening the Control of
Borrowing International Commercial Loans, supra note 224 at arts. 1, 3, 6.
226 See Regulations Governing Bond Issues Abroad by Resident Institutions in
China, supra note 225, art. 9.
227 See Circular for Strengthening the Control of Borrowing International
Commercial Loans, supra note 224, art. 6. (These are the Bank of China, Bank of
Communications, CITIC, China Investment Bank, and Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan,
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian International Trust and Investment Companies). In
addition, after the establishment of the China Export and Import Bank in 1994, it was
also added into the list. See Eximbank Bank Issues 20 Billion Yen- Worth Bond in Japan,
XNHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3780524.
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an individual basis for special projects."8 The use of the foreign
currency revenue is monitored by the exchange control
authorities. 9
In order to raise foreign currency for China's economic
development, China has been quite active in issuing bonds on
international markets since the early 1980s. The first foreign-
currency-denominated overseas bond was issued in 1982 when
CITIC issued a private placement in Japan.23 Since then, state
investment companies and special banks-especially the Bank of
China, China's sole foreign exchange bank 231-have issued bonds
in almost all major international markets.2
The Chinese government, however, did not issue its treasury
bonds abroad as a sovereign borrower until 1987,233 when disputes
between China and several Western countries arising out of the
pre-1949 bonds issued by the Imperial Government were settled.234
228 See Circular for Strengthening the Control of Borrowing International
Commercial Loans, supra note 224, arts. 5-6, translated in LEXIS, World Library,
Chinal File.
229 See id. arts. 3-4; see also Rules for Implementation of Registration of Foreign
Debt, translated in LEXIS, World Library, Chinal File.
230 See China Hopes To Raise More Capital On International Market: CITI
Official, JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 3, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid
File; High Court Upholds China's Default, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 1987, at C6, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
231 BOC first issued overseas bonds in 1984. During the period from 1984 to 1995,
it made 23 offerings and issued 3.9 billion U.S. dollars-worth of overseas bonds, which
accounts for about 40% of the total overseas bonds issued by all Chinese institutions.
See BOC Issues 3.9 Billion US Dollars-Worth of Overseas Bonds, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Feb. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
232 See, e.g., China Issues More Foreign Bonds, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 11,
1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (The Bank of China, the CITIC
and its branches issued $1.86 billion in foreign bonds between Jan. 1982 and July 1986,
in Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Hong Kong); Bank of China Signs Agreement for Bond Issue
in London, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 9, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Xinhua File (The Bank of China for the first time entered the London Eurobond market
issuing $200 million of floating rate note bonds); Bank of China Issues Bonds for First
Time in United States, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File (For the first time, a PRC institution, the CITIC, issued bonds in
the U.S. The Yankee Bond was a 10-year bond with $250 million in total worth.).
233 See China Issues First Batch of State Bond Abroad, XINHIA NEWS AGENCY,
Oct. 1, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (China sold $163.2
million worth of treasury bonds in Germany.).
234 See China, Britain Settle Claims, supra note 148; see also High Court Upholds
China's Default, supra note 230.
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Following this late start, China took a gradual approach and has
successfully issued seven batches of treasury bonds abroad.235
Notably, China has indicated its intention to issue treasury bonds
overseas regularly and frequently in the future.236 Its strategy is to
showcase its economic progress to the world, "build a firm
position in the international capital market,' 2 37 and "provid[e] a
benchmark for other Chinese institutions to issue bonds
overseas." 238  The increasing participation of the Chinese
government in the international market should accelerate
integration into the world economy.
B. Bond Trading
1. An Overview
In 1986, the first bond exchange center was set up by the
reform-minded government in Shenyang, the capital city of the
Liaoning Province, to encourage its enterprises to raise funds
through bond sales.239 The exchange center was operated by the
Shenyang Trust and Investment Company, a local branch of the
235 See China: China Plans Yankee After Smooth Eurobond Return, EUROWEEK,
Sept. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File (Chinese government
issued Euroyen bonds, the first Eurobond issue since 1987); China: China's Pathfinding
Dragon Deal Draws An Overwhelming Response, EUROWEEK, Oct. 15, 1993, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File (China claimed success in the $300 million
Dragon bonds in Hong Kong, the PRC's first ever dollar-denominated international
bond, and the first Dragon bonds issued by a sovereign government); Global Issue by
China, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1994, at D18, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid
File (commenting that the success of the Chinese government's first global bonds
indicated the endorsement of China's economic reform by international investors);
China Issues Government Bonds For The First Time In Japan, XINUA NEWS AGENCY,
July 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (Chinese Finance Ministry
issued 60 billion yen worth of yen-denominated treasury bonds, its first treasury bonds
issuance in Japan); China Offers 700 Million US Dollar Global Bond, Xinhua English
Newswire, June 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10823140 (CS First Boston and
Morgan Stanley led a successful offering of a global bond of $700 million by the
Chinese government).
236 See China Prepares for Flurry of Overseas Treasury Bond Issues, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3912539.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 See New China's First Bond Market Prospers in Initial Month, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Xinhua File.
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CITIC, for over-the-counter trading of enterprises bonds.24
Initially; the purchasers of China's treasury bonds were prohibited
from trading them.241  Because of inflation, these treasury bonds
were very unpopular and black markets developed because people
could not wait until maturity to sell their holdings.2 42  Hedgers
bought these cheap papers and profited by redeeming them both
legally and illegally, or by selling them at higher prices in a
different city.2 43 In addition, stores allowed illegal payments in
treasury bonds. 4 Faced with the rampant spread of black market
treasury bonds trading, the government permitted seven cities to
open exchange centers for treasury bond trading.2 45  Soon, fifty-
four more exchange centers were allowed all over the nation.
46
The variety of the treasury bonds was, however, very small at the
beginning. Only treasury bonds issued in 1985 and 1986 could be
traded.2 47  Nevertheless, by December 1990, when the Shanghai
Securities Exchange was opened, bond exchange was established
248
as one of its major operations.
Bonds are exchanged at four locations: (1) the national
exchanges, including the Shanghai Exchange and Shenzhen
Exchange, (2) the major regional exchanges in cities such as
Wuhan, Beijing, Shenyang, and Tianjin, (3) the over-the-counter
exchanges, and (4) the black market exchanges.249 The regional
exchanges have been especially active in state bond trading since
1992."0 For example, in 1993 Wuhan was the largest treasury
240 See id.
241 See Regulations on Floating 1984 Treasury Bonds, supra note 166.
242 See Chinese Sell Off State Bonds on Black Market, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, Sept.
19, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 See Treasury Bond Transaction Expanded, The Xinhua General Overseas News
Service, May 31, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (The seven trial
cities include Shanghai, Harbin, Shenyang, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chongqing and
Wuhan).
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 See China's Bond Market Comes ofAge: From Forced Sales to Feeding Frenzy,
supra note 181.
249 See China: Where the Bonds Are Being Made and Broken, supra note 160.
250 See id.
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bond trading center with a total volume of more than fifty-billion
yuan ($6 billion).25' Trading instruments included repurchase
agreements, reverse-repurchase agreements, forward-spot
agreements, as well as spot trading.252 In October 1993, the
Shanghai Securities Exchange was allowed to begin bond futures
trading in treasury bonds.253 As bond trading leveled, bond futures
trading soared in the Shanghai Securities Exchange, reaching a
daily turnover of 100 billion yuan ($12 billion) before the futures
trading was shut down in early 1995 due to market irregularities.254
China's other national securities exchange in Shenzhen began
bond trading in March 1994.255
2. Bond Futures Trading
Treasury bond futures trading began in October of 1993 on the
Shanghai Securities Exchange.256 It was aimed at stimulating the
circulation of the bond market and providing a favorable
environment for the then sluggish treasury bond issues.2 Initially
it was dormant, due partly to people's unfamiliarity with the
concept and the then bullish stock market.258 In the first year of
operation, only a little more than one thousand transactions were
completed.259 Nonetheless, bond futures trading subsequently
developed at an astonishing speed.260  In 1994, the turnover of
China's state treasury bond futures trading rocketed to 2.8 trillion
yuan ($331.75 billion).2 6' All major securities exchange markets
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 See China: Shanghai Futures to Trade on Monday, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
254 See China Suspends Treasury Bond Trading After Shanghai Scams, Bus. TIMES,
May 18, 1995, at 16, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
255 See China 's Bond Markets Come ofAge: From Forced Sales to Feeding Frenzy,
supra note 181.
256 See China: Shanghai Futures to Trade on Monday, supra note 253.
257 See First State Bond Futures Market Taking Shape, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
258 See Treasury Bonds Futures Thriving on Shanghai Bourse, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
259 See id.
260 See China State Bond Futures Turnover Rockets in 1994, supra note 183..
261 See id.
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started bond futures trading, with the Shanghai Securities
Exchange being the most active market, accounting for more than
two-thirds of the country's total volume."2 By the first half of
1995', bond futures trading on the SHSE became increasingly
frantic,with a record daily turnover of more than 494 billion yuan
($58.8 billion) set on February 23, almost four times the previous
high set just two days earlier.263 Rules violations and irregularities
caused drastic fluctuation in the market, and the CSRC had to
temporarily halt bond futures trading in February 1995.64
Several days after these incidents, the CSRC and the Shanghai
and Shenzhen Securities Exchanges rushed to announce separate
provisional regulations and restrictions on bond futures trading.265
The national rule further solidified the administrative control of
the central government"' and empowered the CSRC as the
administrative authority for treasury bond futures transactions,
262 See id.
263 See China's Swipe at Bond Speculators Provokes Frenzy, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
264 See Shanghai Punishes Firms for Fixing Bond Trades, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE,
Dec. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; (The Shanghai Stock
Exchange fined its four members for attempting to manipulate the market by bidding up
spot bonds as futures contracts they were holding approached maturity); Shanghai Stops
State Bond Futures. Trading, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 27, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (Treasury bond futures trading through free
quotation was temporarily stopped on Feb. 27, after the exchange discovered that certain
companies deliberately violated rules and manipulated market price in the futures
trading on the treasury bonds coded "327" on Feb. 23) See also Peter Montagnon,
China Blames Two Firms for Bonds Scandal, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995 at 5, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; China Punishes Illegal Treasury Bond Trade
Deals, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Xinhua File. (The incident, dubbed the "327 scandal," erupted on the same day as the
Barings crisis. The Shanghai International Securities Company ("SISCO," also called
"Wanguo"), the largest brokerage house in Shanghai, and another brokerage, Liaoning
Guofa, built positions exceeding the ceiling imposed by the exchange, and attempted to
rig prices by selling massive amounts of bond futures in a rising market. As a result of
the manipulation, the last eight minutes of trading on the day saw turnover of bonds
worth $37 billion. The scandal led to a months-long investigation by the central
government and resulted in the removal of the head of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
economic and criminal sanctions for the brokerages and their traders.)
265 See China: Rule Change to Clean Up Bond Market, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
266 See Provisional Procedures for the Management of Treasury Bond Futures
Transactions Issued by the China Securities Regulation Commission and the Ministry of
Finance of the PRC on 2 3rd February 1995, translated in China. Procedures for
Management of treasury Bond Futures, BBC Monitoring Service, Aug. 2, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
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while also giving the Finance Ministry the right to "supervise and
administer." '267
Securities exchanges must apply to both the CSRC and the
Finance Ministry to open treasury bond futures markets.268  The
transaction contracts drawn up by the exchanges are also subject to
examination and approval by the CSRC and the Finance
Ministry.2 69 For brokerage houses, approval must be obtained from
the CSRC to engage in bond futures transactions, and a special
license for bond futures brokerage must be obtained from the
CSRC in addition to the general brokerage license from the
PBOC.27°
The Provisional Procedures also imposed broader obligations
on the exchanges to regulate bond futures transactions, including
setting trading limits, monitoring trading for irregularity,
disclosing information, and establishing funds for risk
management.' The rule mandates that the exchanges set limits
such as maximum daily price fluctuation and maximum trading
volume.272 The exchanges were also granted broader rights to
inspect member accounts. 3 In addition, the rule prescribed fairly
detailed provisions for account management and client
representation by brokerage institutions.274 Violation of the rules
and regulations by exchanges or brokers can lead to large fines and
administrative and criminal sanctions.275  Moreover, the
Provisional Procedures provided that violations leading to losses
can result in civil liability.
276
Before the regulations took effect, bond futures trading was
resumed in March 1995 .277 Citing continued rule violations, the
267 See id. arts. 5, 29-30.
268 See id. arts. 6-9.
269 See id. art. 10
270 See id. arts. 12-13.
271 See id. ch. 3.
272 See id. art. 15.
273 See id. art. 16.
274 See id. ch. 4.
275 See id. ch. 5.
276 See id. art. 60.
277 See Shanghai to Resume Free Futures Trading in Treasury Bonds, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
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government indefinitely suspended trading on the bond futures
markets nationwide on May 18, 1995, ending the eighteen-month
experiment.278 The CSRC conceded that "China [was] not yet
equipped with conditions for treasury bond futures trading.,
279
3. Problems of the Bond Market
One of the fundamental problems underlying the bond market
is the excessive administrative intervention, that is, the "conflict
between the needs of an efficient capital market and the remains of
the old centrally planned regime. ' '18 Interest rates were decided
administratively and were not market driven.' In order to attract
the public to purchase the state bonds, the coupon rates were set at
about one to two percentage points higher than that of bank
deposits . 2 Even worse, to attract investors to buy treasury bonds,
the government over-sweetened the bond market with anti-
inflation subsidies which were continuously increased.283 The
uncertainty of the interest rate adjustments created tremendous
incentives for market speculation and manipulation. 4 In addition,
because of the relatively high interest rates, most treasury bonds
issued were held by individual investors until maturity.285 As a
result, the liquidity of the bond markets was very low.
286
278 See China Halts Treasury Bond Futures Trading, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, May
17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; see also China Suspends
Treasury Bond trading After Shanghai Scams, Bus. TIMES, May 18, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
279 See China Halts Treasury Bond Futures Trading, supra note 278.
280 Call to Revamp China's Bond Market, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 26, 1995,
at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
281 See id.
282 See ZHANG & YU, supra note 4.
283 The central bank introduced the subsidy in 1993, and adjusted it monthly. For
example, the subsidy for the three-year 1992 state bond was 8.79 percent for Dec. 1994,
9.84 percent for Jan. 1995, 10.38 percent for Feb. 1995. See China State Bond Futures
Turnover Rockets in 1994, supra note 183.
284 See Kevin Murphy, Investors for All the T-Bonds in China, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file. The inflation-based
subsidies on top of the existing interest rate were adjusted every month, leading
speculators to bet on them before they were announced. See id.
285 Very few types of bonds were allowed to be traded and most of them were
purchased by individual investors who would generally hold them until maturity. See
id.
286 See id.
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In addition, administrative control led to thin liquidity by
strictly limiting the types and variety of treasury bonds that could
be traded. As a result, traders were driven to futures trading
unsupported by spot trading.287 This lack of liquidity helped to
promote speculation.288 Thin liquidity also resulted from the
ineffective distribution channels for government bonds.289 In most
of its history, state bond issuance was conducted through "political
campaigns."'2 9' Although in recent years underwriters and securities
dealers have been established, retail distribution continues, and the
government tends to resort to forced placement.
291
Another manifestation of the "conflict" is the short maturity
date. The government had to continuously reduce the maturity
date of the state bonds in order to make them more attractive.292
Most of the treasury bonds issued after 1988 and before 1996 had
maturity dates of three years or less.2 93 The short maturity date not
only restrained the efficient use of the proceeds, but also created
incentives for over-speculation.
4. Recent Developments and Prospects
The Chinese government has recognized these problems and
has struggled to move to a market-oriented treasury bond system.
Noticeably, in 1996, aggressive reform led to initial success in
294treasury bond issuance. Several major steps that have or will betaken will help reduce and eliminate the problems.
287 Only one percent of the trading volume was spot trading, while ninety nine
percent was bond futures trading. In January 1995, the peak time of bond futures
trading, there were only sixteen futures contracts on six different government bonds
traded at the Shanghai Securities Exchange. See id.
288 For example, when officials indicated that most of the 1995 treasury bonds to be
issued would not be tradable in an effort to cool off the futures market, the futures
trading volume almost quadrupled the volume set two days before, due to the
speculation frenzy. Fewer bonds available for trade would have led to the increase of
the value of the existing bonds. See China's Swipe at Bond Speculators Provoked
Frenzy, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwid file.
289 See ZHANG & Yu, supra note 4.
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See infra notes 295-317.
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First, there are signs of less administrative control and more
market oriented systems. Significantly, the PBOC started open
market operations in April of 1996.295 Under this system, the
PBOC trades treasury bonds with banks and other financial
institutions to regulate the financial markets and adjust the money
supply.9 6  For now, the PBOC trades with 14 state-owned
commercial banks on a special network set up for the operations
and will likely enlarge the network in the future to include other
financial institutions. 7
In addition, the Ministry of Finance announced in 1995 its
decision to fundamentally change the way the primary market
operates and to auction treasury bonds in the wholesale market.9
This change was aimed at allowing the central bank to operate in
the open market and to liberalize the treasury bond rates by
allowing them to be set by market demand.2 99 This open bidding
system was partially adopted in 1996.300 Under this plan, the issuer
of treasury bonds, the Finance Ministry, auctions bonds in the
wholesale market to sell them to primary dealers such as banks,
insurers, investment companies, and securities firms, who then
trade them to dealers and individual investors."' This stands in
sharp contrast to the old quota system and administrative decision
on coupon rates.30 2 Most of the record 195.2 billion yuan ($23.52
billion) treasury bonds issued in 1996 were distributed to bidders
according to the interest rates and amounts offered by the bidders
in public tenders.3 3
In addition, the popularity of bonds and the liquidity of the
295 See China Open Market Operations to Help T-Bill Market, REUTER ASIA-
PACIFIC BUSINESS REPORT, Apr. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 See China Plans to Auction Bonds in Wholesale Market, REUTERS, Aug. 27,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
299 See id.
300 See Earnshaw, supra note 157.
301 See China Plans to Auction Bonds in Wholesale Market, supra note 298.
302 See supra note 122-127 and accompanying text.
303 See Earnshaw, supra note 157. As a sign of cautious reluctance, however, 25%
of the total issue was still distributed administratively. See id.
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bond markets have increased as a result of the reform. The
government has restructured the treasury bonds issued in 1996,
making the issues more attractive to investors.3"4 The maturity
spectrum and variety has expanded. The bonds issued in 1996
include three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, five-year,
seven-year, and ten-year bonds.3"5 Unlike the traditional lump sum
payment of interest and principle at maturity, interest is paid on an
annual basis for the seven-year and ten-year bonds, allowing
holders to re-invest the interest .306 The popularity of long-term
bonds will allow the government to expand its issues and to
provide a broader base for secondary bond market development.
Moreover, all the treasury bonds issued in 1996 were allowed to
be listed on the exchanges for trading, whereas only one-third of
the treasury bonds issued in the past were tradable." 7 In addition,
because of the public bidding process, most of the treasury bonds
issued are likely to be held by financial institutions, leading to
greater liquidity on bond markets.3 8
Another important move by the government in 1996 was the
elimination of the anti-inflation subsidy on both bank deposits and
treasury bonds.0 9 As previously discussed, the subsidy was a
major factor provoking the bond futures trading frenzies which led
to the demise of bond futures trading in May 1995.311
The government is also establishing a national company for
treasury bond settlement and custody.3"' This plan was approved
304 See id.
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 See China Open Market Operations to Help T-Bill Market, supra note 296.
308 See Eamshaw, supra note 157.
309 See China Ends Interest Subsidy on Bonds, REuTERs FIN. SERVICE, Mar. 2,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
310 See supra note 283286.
3 See Tong Ting, China: Government Bonds Mart--Company to Manage
Securities, Bus. WEEK (China Daily Supplement), Oct. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Cumws File. The company would be sponsored by the Ministry of
Finance and PBOC, and the existing settlement companies and primary dealers will
become its members. It would link all the exchanges throughout China with computers
and allow them to settle bonds by trading through it. See China to Establish National
Firm for Bonds, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Xinhua File.
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by the State Council in September 1995.312 It is aimed at boosting
the establishment of a nationwide bond market and promoting its
standardization.313 With technical assistance from the World Bank,
it will be based on the existing National Electronic Trading
System ("NETS"), an electronic trading system modeled after
NASDAQ that will electronically carry out the registration,
clearing, and settlement of treasury bonds. 4 The establishment of
the national company will help to curb over-speculation and will
increase the use of paperless bonds.315
China has also indicated its intention to set up government
bond funds to support the secondary market. 6 With all this in
place, it seems that fifteen years after it first issued bonds, China is
heading in the direction of a better bond market and financial
system. Yet, a unified national law governing bond primary and
secondary markets is absent. Although since 1993 there have been
reports that a Treasury Bond Law has been drafted and submitted
to the People's Congress, to date it has not been promulgated.317
V. Market Regulation
A. Disclosure Requirements
The Company Law does not provide as many disclosure
requirements for issuing stock as do the Interim Regulations.
Article 15 of the Interim Regulations lists fifteen items that need
to be included in a prospectus (Zhaogu Shuoming Shu).318 In
addition to the company's name, address, and a short description
of its promoters or issuer (including directors and supervisory
board members), it must include information related to the
issuance, such as the purpose of the stock issuance, a profit and
risk assessment, the total amount of the issue, the book value of
312 See Ting, supra note 311.
313 See id.
314 See id.
315 See id. Paperless bonds issued electronically can help reduce costs and increase
efficiency in bond transactions. See id.
316 See Draft China Bond Law to Tackle Irregularities, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
317 See id.
318 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 15.
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each share before and after the issuance, the time and location and
means to purchase the stocks, the cost of issuing the stock, and the
underwriters."9  The prospectus must also disclose material
information concerning the financial situation of the issuer,
including its business development in the previous three years, a
short-term development plan, an accountant-certified earning
forecast for the next year, an audited financial report on the most
recent three years, and a description of the use of funds raised
from previous issues.320 Furthermore, any important contracts and
lawsuits the issuer is involved in must also be disclosed.32' The
promoters or directors and the lead underwriter must sign the
prospectus certifying that there is no false or misleading
information or omissions, and assuming any liability derived
therefrom.322
Issuers are obligated to provide prospectuses to stock
purchasers,323 while underwriters need only display prospectuses in
their business premises and remind their customers to read them.
324
It seems ineffective to impose the obligation on issuers to provide
stock purchasers with prospectuses because it is their underwriters
and stock dealers who are in the position to directly contact
potential purchasers. This would, in practice, prevent effective
disclosure because it is doubtful that stock purchasers could ever
get a copy of the prospectus from the issuers. In addition, it is not
clear whether any liability would be imposed for the failure to
provide a prospectus during the stock issuance. Technically, a
stock purchaser may sue under Article 77 of the Interim
Regulations, which provides that one will be civilly liable if his
violation of the Regulations results in damages to the purchasers.325
Yet, no provision indicates that such a violation will not be
required to have directly and proximately caused the damages.
Additionally, the Regulation makes no mention of the pre-issuance
319 See id.
320 See id.
321 See id.
322 See id. art. 17.
323 See id. art. 19.
324 See id.
325 See id. art. 77.
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activities of issuers, underwriters, and dealers with respect to the
prospectus.326 Thus, it seems that issuers, underwriters, and dealers
can advertise and solicit offers to purchase well before issuers
submit applications to government agencies. On the other hand,
Article 19 of the Interim Regulations prohibits the disclosure of
the contents of the prospectus before the issuance is approved.
3 .27
Thus, under the Regulations, issuers and their underwriters or
dealers may legally make offers to sell or solicit offers to buy
without giving any information. In these areas, investors in China
are not as well protected as are American investors.328
A company applying to be listed on an exchange must submit
certain documents to the exchange.329 These documents are made
open to the public, along with the "listing announcement"
published by the exchange, if and when the listing is approved.33
Such documents include, among others, audited company financial
reports for the most recent three years or for the years since its
establishment, an auditing report certified by at least two
accountants and their accounting firm(s), and the most recent
prospectus.' The "listing announcement" must include the main
contents of the prospectus.332  In addition, it must include
information regarding, inter alia, the issuing results, the ownership
distribution, the ten biggest shareholders, the directors, the
supervisory board members, and senior management and their
holdings, as well as the business and financial situation in the most
recent years and the earning forecast for the coming year."'3
A public company must submit an unaudited semi-annual
report to the CSRC within sixty days after the end of the first half
of the year, and an audited annual report within one hundred
326 In contrast, the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1933 provides detailed
rules to prohibit inviting or making offers before filing registration with the SEC and
requires a prospectus to be accompanied with the offer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
327 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 19.
328 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
329 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 32.
330 See id. art. 33.
331 See id. art. 32.
332 See id. art. 34.
333 See id.
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twenty days after the end of the year.334 In addition, the directors,
supervisory board members, and senior executives of public
companies must disclose to the CSRC their holdings and must
report any changes in their holdings within ten days of the
change.335 Besides the disclosure to the CSRC, a listed company
must also submit the disclosure documents to the securities
exchange and disclose them to the public.336 Failure to comply
with the disclosure requirements may result in warnings and
fines.337 The Interim Regulations also impose duties upon the
accountants, attorneys, and underwriters to examine and verify the
disclosed information.338
A company also has a duty to dispel any misleading media
reports and rumors that might affect its stock price.3 9  The
disclosures must be published in national newspapers designated
by the CSRC as well as local newspapers designated by the
exchange. 34' A public company must report to the CSRC and the
exchange (if it is a listed company) and disclose to the public any
major event that may affect the market price of its stock.341 There
is, however, one major exception to such disclosure: the listed
company may, with the consent of the exchange, withhold such
disclosure if in its judgment the disclosure would be detrimental to
the company and nondisclosure will not affect the market price.34 2
The exception clause seems counter to the theme of the provision
because the issuer is granted enormous discretion. Whether the
issuer's judgment is reasonable is a complex issue that only a court
is suited to decide. Neither the exchange nor the CSRC has
334 See id. art. 57.
335 See id. art. 62. The reporting obligation remains until six months after they
leave their positions. See id.
336 See id. ch. 6.
337 See id. art. 74(8).
338 See id. arts. 18, 21; see also PRC Law on Registered Accountants, ch. 3, art. 21,
ch. 6, art. 39, translated in BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Nov. 17, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
339 See id. art. 61.
340 See id. art. 63.
341 See id. art. 60. (enumerating a list of thirteen situations that are regarded as
major events).
342 See id.
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enough time and resources to investigate every incident.
Consequently, issuers may take advantage of this rule by not
disclosing major events.
B. Prohibition of Short-Swing Trading
Like § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,343 the
Interim Regulations prohibit directors, supervisory board
members, executive officers, and 5% shareholders from
purchasing or selling stocks of their companies within six months
of any sale or purchase, and assigns the profit from any such sale
to the issuing company.344 The Company Law, which presumably
supercedes the Regulations, at least when conflicts arise, goes
further and adopts a blanket rule forbidding directors, supervisory
members, and executive officers from "transferring" their
company's stocks during their terms in office.3 45 The shares held
by the promoters of a new company may not be traded within
three years after the establishment of the company.346
Promoters, however, may purchase shares and increase their
holding during their terms.347 Moreover, the Company Law makes
no reference as to 5% shareholders. The bright-line transfer
prohibition rule makes it easier to enforce the rules and helps to
reduce the workload of the regulatory agencies and securities
exchanges, to stabilize the market, and to maintain investors'
confidence. At this early stage of market development, these
considerations should override any concern that prohibiting
trading by the officials of a public company would be unfair.
343 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (1994). In the United States, a corporation is entitled to
short-swing profit realized by its directors, executive officers, and 10% shareholders
within six months after purchase or sale of the same security. See id. Suits to recover
such profit are to be brought by the issuer or shareholders on behalf of the issuer
(derivative suit). See id.
344 See id. art. 38. Where the 5% shareholder is a legal person, the Regulations go
further by prohibiting the directors, supervisors, and executive officers of the 5%
holding company from making short-swing profit. See id. Chinese law does not,
however, provide for derivative suits and it is not clear who can sue to recover the short-
swing profits.
345 See Company Law, art. 147. State investment agencies are not, however,
restricted by the prohibition of Article 147. See id. art. 148.
346 See id.
147 See id. The statute uses the word "transfer" ("zhuan rang") instead of "trading"
("jiao yi").
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C. Securities Fraud
In addition to the relevant anti-fraud provisions of the Interim
Regulations and the Company Law, the SCSC promulgated a
special anti-fraud regulation, the Provisional Measures for
Prohibiting Securities Fraud (Provisional Measures). 4 ' The
Provisional Measures expressly forbid four categories of fraud:
insider trading, market manipulation, deceptive practices, and false
statements.349
1. Insider Trading
Article 4 of the Provisional Measures prohibits insiders from
(1) purchasing or selling securities on inside information; (2)
tipping others and making recommendations based on inside
information; or (3) leaking inside information and making it
possible for others to trade on the inside information.350 In
addition, non-insiders may not trade or recommend others to trade
based on inside information obtained by improper means.35" ' An
insider is defined broadly to include any person who, because of
special contacts or professional relationships with the issuer, has
access to material, non-public information.352 Such contact may be
established through (1) owning the issuer's shares, (2) acting as
directors, supervisory board members, and senior executive
officers of the issuer or a company that has a "close relationship"
with the issuer, (3) being a member, or (4) offering employment or
professional services.353 The Provisional Measures are broad with
"I Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures on
Prohibiting Securities Fraud], translated in Interim Procedures Against Securities Fraud
Published, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 24, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
349 See id. art. 2.
350 See id. art. 4.
351 See id.
352 See id. art 6; Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 81(14).
353 See id. Article 6 of the Provisional Measure lists in detail the potential insider
candidates, including (1) directors, supervisory board members, senior executive
officers, typists, secretaries, and other employees who have access to inside information
at work; (2) constructive insiders such as attorneys, accountants, asset appraisers,
investment advisors, and members of securities firms who have access to inside
information while conducting business with the issuer; (3) government agents in various
administrative agencies which exercise supervisory and regulatory functions over the
issuer; (4) reporters, editors, and workers in print shops who have access to inside
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respect to government officials and employees: personnel in
government agencies that have regulatory and supervisory
authority over the issuer are all classified as insiders. 54  This
provision is necessary because Chinese administrative agencies are
especially powerful and can directly affect a company's policy and
activities. 5 Article 6(5), a catch-all provision which includes as
insiders anyone that has access to insider information even if
356through lawful means, however, seems overinclusive.
Inside information refers to any material, non-public
information that may affect the market price of securities, but does
not include market analyses and predictions based on public
information.357 Thus, the insider trading provisions are indeed very
expansive. Inside information is not limited to information on
issuing companies. It also includes information regarding
,governmental policy changes that may affect the securities
markets' pricing."' Presumably, governmental officials would be
liable for leaking inside information under Article 4(2), 5, or 6 of
the Provisional Measures.359 In practice, however, it may be
impossible for the provision to be applied strictly. Penalties for
violating the provision include forfeiture of profits, severe fines,
and, with respect to violations by issuers, revocation of the right to
issue securities.360
The Interim Regulations prohibit personnel in the securities
business and securities regulatory agencies from directly or
information through professional contact or contractual relationship with the issuer; (5)
any person who obtains inside information through any lawful means. See id.
354 See id. art. 6(3).
"I See infra notes 557-58 and accompanying text.
356 See id. art. 6(5). It is unclear whether the CSRC and the Chinese courts will
apply the provisions as broadly as the language of the statute requires. In contrast, U.S.
courts impose liability for insider trading only when there is a fiduciary duty to disclose
inside information before trade. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). A
noninsider tippee is liable for insider trading only if the insider tipper's purpose of
tipping is for his own personal benefit (thus violating his fiduciary duty), and the tippee
knew or should have known of the violation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
351 See Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348, art.
5. More than 20 examples of material information are set forth in the provisional
measures. See id.
351 See id. art. 5(9).
359 See id. arts. 4(2), 5-6.
360 See id art. 14.
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indirectly holding or trading securities for themselves, other than
securities in investment funds.36 In addition, under the Shanghai
Regulations, persons in the issuing company's supervising
agencies 362 are prohibited from trading the company's stocks.3 63
The Shenzhen Regulations further prohibit government and party
officials and armed forces personnel from trading stocks.364,
Accountants, property appraisers and lawyers who provide
professional services for a company are considered to be insiders
and are prohibited from trading on inside information.3 65 In
addition, the Interim Regulations provide a per se rule regarding
such accountants, property appraisers, and lawyers.366
Professionals involved in the issuer's stock issuance are not
allowed to purchase or sell the issuer's stock until six months after
the underwriting agreement expires.367 With respect to a listed
company, professionals are prohibited from purchasing or holding
the company's stock until five working days after the documents
they have prepared for the company become public.368 The result
of this provision is that if lawyers, accountants, or appraisers are
hired by the same issuer from time to time, it is impossible for
them to hold the issuer's stock.
2. Market Manipulation
Manipulation of the market by large broker-dealers and
investors has been one of the most serious problems in China's
361 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 9.
362 Chinese companies are administratively governed by both local governments
and specialized ministries under the State Council or their local branches. These
ministries often exert great control over the companies in their specialized industries.
363 See Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of Securities
Trading, supra note 45, art. 40(4).
31 See Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 45; see, e.g., Hubei Vice-Governor
Sacked for Illegal Stock-Trading, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 2, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File. (former vice-governor of central Hubei province
ousted for investing in stock market and trading stocks with public funds).
365 See Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348, art.
6(2).
361 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, arts. 40-41.
367 See id. art. 40; see also PRC Law on Registered Accountants, supra note 339,
art. 22.
368 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 40.
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developing securities industry. 69 In fact, this was the major reason
for the national shutdown of bond futures trading in May, 1995.370
The Provisional Measures expressly prohibit manipulative
behavior.71 Securities institutions violating the rules may face
fines, confiscation of profits, restrictions on business activities,
and revocation of their business licenses. 72 Violations by listed
companies may result in de-listing?73 In addition, criminal
prosecutions may be initiated.
74
3. Deceptive Practices
In order to protect investors, the Provisional Measures also
specifically enumerate a series of deceptive practices that are
strictly prohibited and impose penalties for engaging in such
practices. 75 Securities institutions are prohibited from promising
customers guaranteed returns, offering compensation for losses,
trading for themselves on customers' accounts, and churning.376
They are also required to execute customers' orders faithfully and
to make timely confirmations.3  Securities registration and
clearing firms are prohibited from violating procedural rules and
from mortgaging customer securities.378 In addition, the failure on
the part of an issuer or an issuer's representatives to provide
prospectuses to investors at the time of the issuance of the stocks
is regarded as a deceptive practice.37 9
369 See, e.g, supra note 264.
310 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
371 See Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348, arts.
2,7-8, 15-17.
372 See id. art. 15.
313 See id. art. 16.
374 See id. art. 26.
375 See id. arts. 9-10, 18-19. Individuals violating this provision may be fined
between 30 thousand yuan ($3,600) and 300 thousand yuan ($36,000), and may face
revocation of licenses as well. Institutions may also face severe penalties. See id. art.
18.
376 See id. art. 10.
377 See id.
378 See id.
371 See id. Note that here, an issuer has an obligation to provide a prospectus. For a
discussion of this issue, see supra notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
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4. False and Misleading Statements
Any form of untrue or misleading statements or omissions of
material facts in a statement connected with the issuance or trading
of securities that would affect the public investors' decisions in
their securities investment are prohibited under the Provisional
Measures."' This applies to statements of issuers, securities
institutions, law firms, accounting firms, appraisal agencies,
securities exchanges, self-regulated securities associations, and
applies to statements to the public as well as to securities
regulatory agencies.38" ' Violations may result in civil and criminal
liability.8 2 Under a new amendment to the Company Law passed
by the National People's Congress in 1995, violations may result
in up to five years in prison and up to a two hundred thousand
yuan ($24,000) fine.383
Securities violations are investigated by the CSRC or SCSC.
384
Usually, the CSRC imposes administrative sanctions on the
offenders under the Interim Regulations and the Provisional
Measures.385 Although the Interim Regulations provide that
criminal sanctions should be sought where the conduct constitutes
a criminal act,38 6 the government often has to resort to general
criminal law provisions that do not fit well with securities
activities. Except for the new provisions on false statements,3 7
there are no other criminal provisions specifically applicable to
securities violations. Given the fact that fraudulent activity is
prevalent in the securities industry,388 such laws are urgently
380 See Provisional Measures, supra note 348, arts. 1 -12.
381 See id. art. 12.
382 See id. arts. 20-22; see also Company Law, supra note 21 arts. 207, 212, 219.
Under the Company Law, where an issuing company provides falsified financial reports
to the public, the responsible officers are subject to fines between 10,000 yuan ($1,200)
and 100,000 yuan ($12,000), and criminal liability. See id. art. 212.
383 See Guanyu Chengzhi Weifan Gongsifa de Fanzui de Jueding [Decisions on
Punishing Criminals Violating the Company Law], arts. 3-4, 6.
384 See Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348, art.
24.
385 See id. art. 25.
386 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 78; Provisional Measures on
Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348, art. 26.
387 See Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348.
388 See, e.g., Chinese Reporters Jailed in Bond Scandal, UPI, Apr. 13, 1994,
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needed to maintain investor confidence and market stability.
It is not clear whether investors have private rights of action
against securities institutions and their employees, issuing
companies and their officers, or others who violate the securities
regulations. Private rights of action against broker dealers for
deceptive practices may be available under the ambiguous
language of Article 23 of the Provisional Measures.389
Technically, private actions ought to be allowed under Article 77
of the Interim Regulations.3 90 Because civil suits have not been a
common practice and have only recently been utilized, it remains
to be seen how the Chinese courts will apply this provision.
D. Takeover Regulations
The Interim Regulations are explicitly hostile to large
individual shareholders. 39' Article 46 prohibits individual A
shareholders from holding more than five percent of a company's
stock.392 This is understandable when one is reminded that China
still claims to be a socialist country and maintains that public
ownership must play a leading role in its economy.3 93 Another
reason for this hostility may be the fear of securities market
manipulation by individuals. Noticeably, the language of Article
48 of the Interim Regulations seems to permit a promoter to own
more than 30% of the common stock of the company he
promoted.39 4 The only explanation for the inconsistency between
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; Discipline Commission Spokesman on
Dismissal of Hubei Vice Governor, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 2, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; Shanghai Broker Arrested for Embezzlement,
REUTERS EUROPEAN Bus. REPORT, June 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
389 See Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities Fraud, supra note 348, art.
23.
390 See Interim Regulations, supra note'38, art. 77.
391 See id. art. 46.
392 See id. When an individual A shareholder holds more than five percent of the
total shares of a listed company, the company must, upon CSRC approval, buy back the
shares in excess at the original purchase price or market price (whichever is less), except
where the five percent holding is caused by the reduction of the total number of shares.
See id. Foreign investors with B shares or other shares are not, however, subject to this
restriction. See id.
393 See Xianfa [PRC Constitution], art. 6, translation available in LEXIS, World
Library, Chinal File.
394 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 48.
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Articles 46 and 48 is that the Interim Regulations were drafted
under the Opinion on Setting Standards for Joint Stock
Companies, which prohibits individuals from acting as
promoters.39  Obviously the Article 46 Interim Regulations
presumed that no promoter could be an individual; therefore,
prohibiting an individual from holding more than 5% common
stock would not affect the promotership.
This conclusion conflicts with the provisions of the new
Company Law. The Company Law permits promoters of a joint
stock company to be individuals.396 The number of promoters can
be as few as five.397 At the same time, when establishing a joint
stock company by issuing shares to the public (Muji Sheli), the
Law requires promoters to purchase at least 35% of the shares of
the new company and sell the rest of the shares to the public.39 '
Under this legal framework, an individual can hold at least 7% of
the shares as a promoter. Thus, the provision in the Company Law
reflecting the more liberal view on economic reform clearly
requires the revision of the Interim Regulations. It is unclear how
the rule is applied in practice. To be consistent with the spirit of
the Company Law, the limitation on individual ownership should
be removed. Private companies and private ownership have
already been allowed in China. Ownership percentage limitations
have not been imposed on B shareholders or H shareholders.
There is no evidence to indicate that Chinese individuals or private
enterprises tend to be more deceptive than State or collectively
owned corporate shareholders. Furthermore, individuals and
private companies are not as immune to prosecution by law
enforcement agencies as are state enterprises, which are protected
by "multi-threaded ties to government organizations."3 9
Under the Interim Regulations, when a legal person
395 See Opinions on Setting Standards for Joint Stock Companies, supra note 32,
art. 10.
396 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 75; see also Fang, supra note 35, at 258
(containing the response of Fang, who was involved in drafting the Company Law,
responds to criticism on the Company Law's allowing individuals and private enterprise
to act as promoters of joint stock companies).
397 See Company Law, supra note 2 1, art. 75.
398 See id. art. 83.
399 Fang, supra note 35, 258.
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shareholder's holding exceeds five percent of a listed company's
total shares, the shareholder must, within three working days,
report this fact to the listed company, the exchange, the CSRC,
and the public.400 Thereafter, the shareholder must report again if
his or her holdings reach two percent of the issuer's total
outstanding shares. 41  The targeted company, however, does not
have much leeway to fend off a hostile takeover because a
company is prohibited from buying back its own stock except
when it changes its registration and reduces its capital or merges
402
with another company.
When a legal person stockholder's holding exceeds thirty
percent of the listed company's total shares, the shareholder is
required to make an offer within forty-five working days to all
other shareholders to purchase their shares.4 3 The offering price
must be the higher of either the highest price paid by the offerer in
the previous twelve months, or the average market price in the
thirty-working-day-period before the offer was made.4 4 Although
this rule was intended to prevent market speculation and
manipulation, it artificially distorts the market and potentially
sacrifices the benefit to the offerees if the market price does not
properly reflect the actual value of the stocks.
VI. Foreign Investment in Chinese Securities
Rapid economic growth in China has generated great demand
for foreign capital and immense interest by foreign investors.4 5
Before the securities exchanges were established in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, foreign investment was mainly limited to active
400 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 47.
401 See id. In 1993, a Shenzhen company (Bao An Enterprises) initiated a bid for
Shanghai Yanzhong Industrial, in an attempt to drive up the stock price of Yanzhong.
Bao An was fined after it aborted the takeover bid with a large profit, on the ground that
it failed to properly disclose its holding position after it reached five percent of
Yanzhong's stock. See China Watchdog Snarls Over First Hostile Takeover, REUTERS
ASIA-PACIFIC Bus. REP., Oct. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
402 See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 149; Interim Regulations, supra note 38,
art. 41; see also Tarbutton, supra note 94.
o3 See Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 48.
404 See id.
405 See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 45-46.
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directive investment.40 6  Contractual joint ventures, equity joint
ventures, and wholly-owned foreign enterprises provided
foreigners with the greatest opportunities as a result of China's
economic growth.40 7 Beginning in 1982, China also started issuing
bonds in the international markets. 48  These issues could meet
neither the domestic capital demand nor the substantial
international investment interest. In late 1991, China issued
special shares for the first time, the so called B Shares, that are
listed on Chinese securities exchanges and are reserved
exclusively for foreign investors and overseas Chinese in Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Macao.40 9  To further internationalize its
securities market, listing of Chinese companies on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange was started in 1993 and was extremely
successful.410  In addition, companies have been listed in
international markets such as New York, London, Vancouver,
Toronto, and Singapore with great success.41' It appears that China
will continue listing shares in international markets.412
406 See generally Daniel J. Brink & Xiao Lin Li, A Legal and Practical Overview of
Direct Investment and Joint Ventures in the "New" China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 567
(1995).
417 See id.
408 See supra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
49 See Potter, supra note 30, at 79. The special shares were adopted rather than
mutual funds because issuing these special shares posed fewer technical difficulties and
demanded less in personnel or experience. See Qian, supra note 14, at 90.
Nevertheless, the government has also taken measures to experiment with mutual funds
to attract foreign capital. See Wo Yinjin Jingwai Jiin Fen Liangbu Jinxing, [China Will
Take Two Steps to Allow Foreign Mutual Funds into China], PEOPLE'S DAILY (Overseas
ed.), Aug. 9, 1995, at 2. In July, 1995, the CSRC announced that China will authorize
the establishment of Sino-foreign joint ventures in mutual funds management. See id.
Two steps will be taken to allow foreign funds into China: first, China will allow only
the well-known foreign funds with good reputations to invest in the A shares market and
also in the companies that have issued both A shares and B shares or H shares; second, if
the first step is successful, more foreign funds will be allowed to invest in China's
securities market. See id.
410 See infra notes 473-77 and accompanying text.
411 See infra notes 478-83 and accompanying text.
412 In September 1995, the SCSC approved seven more companies to be listed
abroad. According to the report, the principle idea is "to present one company (to
international securities markets) whenever one is ready," indicating the government is
actively helping companies to list abroad. Guowuyuan Zhengquan Wei Pizhun Yiqi
Jintuan Deng Qi Jia Gongsi Wei Haiwai Shangshi Yuxuan Qiye [The SCSC approved
Seven Companies Including the No.] Auto Group to List Shares Abroad], PEOPLE'S
DAILY (Overseas ed.), Sept. 28, 1995, at 1.
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In the meantime, China has also taken steps to attract foreign
funds to invest in China's domestic markets.4 13 Foreign securities
firms are allowed to set up joint ventures to invest in China's stock
and bond markets. 414  These measures have helped listed
companies obtain foreign capital and, more importantly, have
facilitated the development and standardization of the Chinese
securities industry. 5
A. Foreign Capital Shares Listed Within the Border-B Shares
Foreign investment shares listed witAin the border, B Shares,
were first used in November 1991 to open up China's stock market
to foreign investors. 6 B Shares were issued and traded in
Shanghai and Shenzhen under similar local regulations.
Under the Shanghai Administrative Measures, B Shares are
reserved exclusively for legal or natural persons of foreign
countries and legal or natural persons of overseas Chinese descent
in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 4" These shares are
denominated in Chinese currency (Renminbi), but are traded in
foreign currency.419 Dividends and capital gains can be sent
abroad.4 0 Besides the requirements for issuing A Shares that are
open to the domestic investors, the issuer of B Shares must meet
certain additional conditions with respect to foreign currency
reserve and resources. 41'  Foreign securities firms may act on
behalf of the Chinese firms in trading B shares to foreign
413 See Overseas Funds Venturing into China's Stock Market, XTNHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (stating that
Morgan Stanley of the United States established a joint bank, China International
Capital Corporation Limited, to deal in treasury bonds, B share stocks, fund raising and
fund management).
414 See id.
415 See infra notes 405-15 and accompanying text.
416 See Potter, supra note 30, at 77-82.
417 See id. at 80. For a detailed discussion of the local B shares regulations, see id.
at 77-82.
418 See id. at 79.
419 See id.
420 See id.
421 The issuer must be a specially approved joint stock company and have stable
and sufficient foreign currency income to pay annual dividends. See id
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investors.422  B Share regulations in Shenzhen are similar to the
423Shanghai measures.
Although B Shares provoked great interest and excitement
among foreign investors in 1992, they have since faired poorly.424
Problems such as lack of liquidity, restrictions on foreign
securities firms, lack of proper disclosure of information, and
uncertainty of B shareholders' rights with respect to the issuers,
have made the B Shares less attractive to investors.425
Consequently, B share markets have been in the doldrums in the
426past two years.
In order to boost the B share market and standardize the B
Share rules, the State Council repealed the local rules and issued
the Provisions on Listing Foreign Investment Shares Inside China
by Joint Stock Companies (B Share Provisions). 42" The SCSC then
promulgated implementation rules for the B share Provisions, the
Listing of Foreign Investment Shares Inside China by a Joint
Stock Companies Provisions Implementing Rules (B Share
Implementing Rules). 42' The new B Share Provisions and the B
Share Implementing Rules unified and standardized the issuing
and trading rules and procedures of B Shares under the Company
Law, and together formed a uniform and integrated legal
framework for B Shares. More importantly, these provisions are
likely to improve the environment of the B Shares market.429
Unlike the local rules, the new regulations rename B Shares as
422 See id. at 81.
423 Shenzhen Interim Procedures allows foreign investors to subscribe to B shares
either directly or through securities agents of their choice, while Shanghai rules require
them to act through institutions approved by the exchange. See Potter, supra note 30, at
81. B shares in Shenzhen were initially traded in Hong Kong dollars and later changed
to U.S. dollars, which are used in Shanghai. See Qian, supra note 14, at 90.
424 See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 55.
425 See Roell, supra note 135, at 18.
426 See id.
427 B Share Provisions, supra note 101.
428 Gufe Youxian Gongsi Jingnei Shangshi Waizi Gu Guiding de Shishi Xize
[Listing Foreign Investment Shares Inside China by Joint Stock Companies Provisions
Implementing Rules], original text and translation available in 10 CHINA L. & PRAc. 26
(1996) [hereinafter B Share Implementing Rules].
429 See C. Y. Leung & Lim Seok Hui, An Overview of China's New B Share
Legislative Reforns, 10 CHINA L. & PRAC. 20, 25 (1996).
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"foreign investment shares listed inside China," presumably to
better reflect the nature of the stocks.430 The B Share Provisions
dramatically increases the number of targeted investors. In
addition to eligible investors under the old local rules, Chinese
citizens residing outside China are now allowed to invest.41  Yet,
domestic investors are still excluded from holding B Shares. The
Regulations do, however, reserve the right of the SCSC to permit
unspecified "other investors" to hold B Shares. 32
Commentators have argued that eliminating the distinctions
between B Shares and A Shares would promote the development
of China's securities market.433 The government may eventually
allow domestic investors into the B Share market. 34  The
flexibility of the B Share Provisions may indicate this.
In addition, B Shares must be issued in registered form, and
the issuing company should keep a register.43' The domestic
shareholders of a company with B Shareholders must also be
registered.436 Presumably the purpose of registration is to facilitate
company communication with shareholders and to provide
sufficient notice.
Like the Interim Regulations, a centralized planning
mechanism remains in the new B Share Provisions and B Share
Implementing Rules. The scale of the total share issuance is
controlled by the state, so the quota system is retained.437  In
addition, the use of the foreign capital collected through the public
offering must conform to the state industrial policy and relevant
430 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 3.
431 See id. art. 4. There are a large number of overseas Chinese living outside
mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. They have been the major source of
foreign capital investment in China. See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 49.
432 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 4.
433 See Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Why Does Not The Rising Water Lift The Boat?
Internationalization of The Stock Markets and the Securities Regulatory Regime in
China, 29 INT'L. LAW 615, 618-19 (1995).
131 In fact, in Shenzhen, many domestic investors have already illegally flocked into
the B shares market, pushing the market up by almost 60%. The CSRC, in part for fear
of drastic market fluctuation, refrained from forcefully throwing them out, and instead
merely issued a warning in newspapers as a gesture. See Roell, supra note 135, at 17.
135 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art 3.
436 See id.
437 See id. art. 2.
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regulations on fixed capital investment and on foreign capital
utilization.43 Thus, under the new policies and regulations, the
government maintains control over the use of the foreign capital.
Like the Interim Regulations, the B Share Provisions set forth
the minimum qualifications required to issue B Shares.439 In
offering a new joint stock company through B Shares to the
public, the promoters must purchase at least 35% of the total
shares issued (A Shares), and the total capital provided by the
promoters must be at least 150 million yuan ($18 million).440 The
shares issued to the public must be more than 25% of the total
shares issued."' As a result, only large companies can issue B
shares. Moreover, where a state enterprise is a promoter or the
issuing company is transformed from a state enterprise, the state
enterprise must have been profitable and have not seriously
violated any law and regulation in the three years immediately
preceding the issuance."42  These two requirements may be
intended to ensure the high quality of the issuers and to reduce the
risks for foreign investors. The requirements, however, ignore the
problem of liquidity.
For an established public company to issue foreign capital
shares, the issuer must have been successful in the last public
offering and the use of the funds therefrom must have been
appropriate and effective."3 The net capital worth of the company
must be at least 15 million yuan." In addition, the company
cannot have violated any law or regulation since the last public
offering and must have been profitable during the three years
preceding the intended offering.44
A complex multi-step application, examination, and approval
process like that in the Interim Regulations has also been retained.
438 See id. art. 8(1).
439 See id. arts. 8-9.
40 See id. art. 8(4),(5).
441 See id. art. 8(6). Where the total value of stock issued is more than 0.4 billion
yuan ($48.2 million), the minimum ratio may be reduced to 15%. See id.
442 See id. art. 8(7), (8).
443 See id. art. 9.
44 See id.
445 See id
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The Provisions and the Implementing Rules clarify the proper
procedures for a company to follow in applying to issue B
Shares. 446 In the case of issuing B Shares to establish a new
company, or where an existing company has never issued B
Shares, approval from the SCSC is required.447 The company or
promoters must first apply to the provincial government or the
relevant supervisory ministry in the central government, which
then recommends the company or promoters to the SCSC.4 ' The
documents required for submission to the SCSC at this stage are
enumerated in the Implementing Rules.49 The SCSC will then
choose the appropriate company upon consultation with other
relevant ministries under the State Council. 40  The selected
company must then submit an application with all of the required
documents to the CSRC for examination. Upon a finding of
conforming documents, the CSRC will recommend an approval to
the SCSC.452 A company that has issued B Shares previously need
not obtain approval from the SCSC.453 It must; however, submit
the documents required by Article 12 of the B Share Provisions to
the provincial or ministry government, which then submits them to
the CSRC for examination and approval. 54 Noticeably, when
applying for examination and approval, the Implementing Rules
indicate that documents provided by foreign accountants, lawyers,
or appraisers are optional.455  As an exception to the relevant
446 See id. art. 10; B Share Implementing Rules, supra note 428, arts. 4-5.
44' See id.
448 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 10.
44 See B Share Implementing Rules, supra note 428, art. 4. These include: (1)
recommendation letters from the provincial or ministerial government, (2) an
application, (3) proof of materials for the qualifications required by the B Share
Provisions, (4) feasibility report for the use of the proceeds, (5) the Company's balance
sheet and earning statement for the preceding year certified by qualified accountants
registered in China, (6) the Company's after-tax profit forecast for the current year, (7)
promoters' opinions on the value of their assets to be contributed, (8) prospect analysis
by qualified securities institutions. See id.
450 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 10.
4 See id. arts. 11-12.
452 When the total face value of the foreign capital shares to be issued exceeds $30
million, State Council approval is required. See id. arts. 2, 10.
153 See B Share Implementing Rules, supra note 428, art. 7.
454 See id.
411 See id. art. 8. If such documents are prepared, however, they must be submitted.
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provisions of the Company Law and Interim Regulations, the B
Share Provisions allow issuance of B Shares within 12 months
after issuance of shares to domestic investors.456 Implicitly, issuing
B Shares within 12 months after another issuance of the same
would not be allowed.
Both foreign and domestic securities firms can underwrite B
Shares.457 Special licenses are required, however.458 At least one
participant in the underwriting 459 must be an approved Chinese
underwriter."46 To engage in a B share dealing and brokerage
business, securities institutions must obtain approval from the
CSRC.46' Foreign firms may also act as brokers and dealers in B
share trading.452 In contrast to the old rules, the B Share Provisions
permit B Shares and their derivative forms to be traded abroad. .53
This is necessary to legalize the secondary listing of B Shares in
international markets, which has in practice already been done.4
One significant improvement of the Provisions and the
Implementing Rules over the old local rules, Interim Regulations
and Company Law, is that they afford better protection for
shareholders. The Provisions explicitly provide that foreign
shareholders have the same rights and obligations as their
46domestic counterparts. .65 In addition, foreign shareholders may
entrust the exercise of their shareholder rights to an agent..5
Hence, they may vote by proxy and do not have to be physically
See id.
456 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 13. But cf Company Law, supra
note 21, art. 137(1); Interim Regulations, supra note 38, art. 10(2).
1 7 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 18; B Share Implementing Rules,
supra note 428, art. 3 1.
458 See B Share Implementing Rules, supra note 428, art. 31.
459 See id.
460 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 18.
461 See id. art. 32.
462 See id. art. 33.
463 See id.
46 In July 1995, China Merchants Shekou Port Service Co. Ltd, which lists its B
shares in the Shenzhen Exchange, was the first Chinese company to place a secondary B
share listing on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. See Chinese Enterprise Offers "B"
Shares in Singapore, XrNHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.
5 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 5.
46 See id. art. 21.
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present at the shareholders meetings. Moreover, the Provisions
adopt for the first time the notion of the duty of loyalty (chengxin)
and diligence (qinmian), and provide that directors, supervisory
members, and other high level executives-including financial
officers and the secretary of the board--have such duties to the
company.! 7 The Provisions did not, however, clearly provide a
shareholder's right to pursue a derivative action. Without such a
provision, shareholders may not be allowed to initiate actions
against directors and officers who have violated their fiduciary
duties to the company. Thus, the force of Article 6 may not be
meaningful.
The Provisions also protect shareholders by mandating
disclosure in a form comprehensible to foreign investors. While
adopting the Chinese rules and procedures for accounting and
reports, Article 15 permits issuers to adjust financial reports for
foreign investors under the accounting standards of other
countries, provided that an explanation of the relevant differences
is included. 468 In addition, necessary translations of disclosure
documents must be made in a commonly-used foreign language."6 9
The Implementing Rules also provide accounting and auditing
rules, as well as procedures for B share issuers to follow in
employing accountants.470
B. Listing Shares Abroad-H Shares and N Shares
The demand for capital due to rapid economic expansion drove
China to list its companies in international markets. Public
offerings of shares abroad are permitted, with the approval of the
CSRC, by both the Company Law and the Interim Regulations. 4 7'
In 1994, the Regulations on Overseas Share Issues and Listings
were promulgated, governing the issuance and listing of Chinese
companies' securities in foreign countries, including Hong
467 See id. art. 6. Although the Company Law provided required similar duties, it
did not adopt the notions of loyalty and diligence. See Company Law, supra note 21,
art. 118.
468 See B Share Provisions, supra note 101, art. 15.
469 See id. art. 17.
470 See B Share Implementing Rules, supra note 428 arts. 39-44.
471 See Company Law, supra note 21, arts. 85, 155; Interim Regulations, supra note
38, art. 6.
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472Kong.
In reality, long before the promulgation of the Company Law
and the Interim Regulations, Chinese companies had begun listing
their shares in Hong Kong.473 Formal approval by the Chinese
government for overseas listing came in late 1992, when nine state
enterprises were authorized to seek listing on the Securities
Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) 4  The first six were listed on
SEHK in 1993 and each received an enormous response.4 5  By
August 1996, there were twenty-one Chinese companies listed in
Hong Kong and the Chinese government was speculated to be
planning to increase their number. 6 Shares listed directly in Hong
Kong are dubbed H Shares. For decades, Hong Kong has
provided a window through which China interacts with the
Western world. Since 1993, the H Share listing of large Chinese
companies has made Hong Kong the main entry point into China
for foreign investors. 7 With its more developed securities market,
Hong Kong, when returned to Chinese control in 1997, will likely
be the most important market through which China will attract
foreign capital.
Based on the successful experience of its Hong Kong listings,
the Chinese government has also moved its companies into other
international securities markets, particularly New York. Several
Chinese companies have been listed in New York since July 1993,
when the state enterprise Shanghai Petrochemical Company listed
its American Depository Shares representing shares listed in Hong
472 A translation of the regulations appears in China: Regulations on Overseas
Share Issues and Listings, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 7, 1994, LEXIS, World
Library, Txtlne File [hereinafter Foreign Shares Regulations].
473 See David Whittall, Heavy-Hitting H Shares, 21 CHINA Bus. REv. 44 (1994).
For example, between 1991 and 1993, many PRC-controlled companies engaged in
"back door listing"--taking over listed, but inactive Hong Kong companies and
injecting their own assets into them. See id. Many other Hong Kong-registered
companies held by the Chinese government or Chinese enterprises also listed shares in
the Hong Kong Exchange. See id.
474 See id. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong is referred to by some as the HKSE.
475 See id. For example, the fist listed company, Tsingtao Brewery, was
oversubscribed 100-fold at its IPO. See id.
476 See China May Approve Fourth Batch of Firms for Exchange Listings, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
477 See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 61.
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Kong on the New York Stock Exchange.478 In 1994, another large
state enterprise, Shandong Huaneng Power Development Co. Ltd.
became the first PRC enterprise to list its securities directly in
New York (where its shares are called N Shares).479 In addition to
Hong Kong and New York, China has also placed primary and
secondary listings of companies in Singapore,4 0 Canada,81 and is
considering similar issuances in Tokyo48
2 and London.413
Shares of Chinese companies listed outside China (such as H
and N Shares) are denominated in Renminbi, the Chinese
currency, but are subscribed for and traded in foreign currencies. 4
The dividends are declared in Renminbi but paid in foreign
currencies .485
The Foreign Shares Regulations authorize the SCSC and
CSRC to negotiate with foreign securities exchanges and
regulatory agencies to reach agreements to coordinate the activities
relating to the issuance of Foreign Shares.4 16  To list Foreign
478 :See Chinese Petrochemical Company To Sell Shares, REUTERS ASIA-PACIFIC
BUSINESS REPORT, July 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwtd File (The
company used Hong Kong as the primary market and issued the American Depository
shares, or ADS, in the U.S.); see also China's Jilin Chemical Priced, Set To Trade
Monday, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, May 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File (reporting China's Jilin Chemical Industrial Co. Ltd. issued 4.65 million
American Depository Shares in the New York Stock Exchange based on its primary
listing in Hong Kong).
479 See Mark S. Bergman, Richard S. Borisoff & Nicholas C. Howson, First Direct
Listing for Chinese Company in New York, 13 INT'L. FIN. LAW REV. 41, 41 (1994).
480 See Chinese Enterprise Offers "B" Shares in Singapore, supra note 464.
481 See First Chinese Company Issues Stocks In Canada, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (reporting
China's Guilin International Rubber Co. Ltd., the first Chinese company to be listed in
Canada, issued 15.5 million shares of stock in the Toronto Stock Exchange).
482 See Chinese Stock Expected to Debut in Tokyo by End of Year: Report, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, July 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Those
expectations have recently been stymied by territorial disputes between China and
Japan. See Due to Tensions Over the Diaoyu Islands, Mainland Business to List in
London Rather than Tokyo, DAILY NEWS TOKYO, Nov. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld file.
483 See Chinese Stocks to Be Listed on London Exchance, FIN. TIMES (JAPAN
EDITION), Oct. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
484 See Foreign Shares Regulations, supra note 472, art. 3.
481 See id. art. 27.
486 See id. art. 4.
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Shares, approval by the SCSC must be obtained."7 In addition, the
SCSC and a company's registration and examination agencies
authorized by the State Council have the right to mandate that the
issuer include in its company bylaws and articles of association
certain provisions defined by the SCSC.
411
Aimed at standardizing the issuing company's structure and
activities and maintaining foreign investor confidence, the Foreign
Shares Regulations place great emphasis on adhering to company
charters and bylaws.489  The government can formulate certain
provisions for the charter and bylaws of an issuer .490 Article 15
specifies that a company's charter and bylaws are binding on all
relevant parties"9 Article 23 requires directors, supervisory'board
members, and executive officers to act in accordance with the
provisions of the company charter and bylaws.492  Furthermore,
disputes are to be resolved among the shareholders, directors,
supervisory board members, and executive officers in accordance
with the charter and bylaws.4 93 This unprecedented utilization of
company charters and bylaws helps bring issuing companies closer
to Western standards. Strong charters and bylaws can effectively
impose duties and obligations on the company's directors and
management and prevent the infringement of shareholders' rights,
thus making Chinese issues more attractive to foreign investors.
In addition, the Foreign Shares Regulations provide rules
regarding the hiring and dismissing of independent auditors, define
the rights and obligations of auditors, and help to ensure the
independence of auditors.494
Another distinctive feature of the Foreign Shares Regulations
is its elaborate procedures for shareholder notice. As in the B
Share Provisions, all shareholders holding Foreign Shares of a
487 See id. art. 8.
488 See id. art. 13.
489 See id. arts. 13-15.
490 See id. art. 13; see also The Articles of Association of Companies Seeking a
Listing Outside the PRC Prerequisite Clauses, CHINA L. & PRAc., May 8, 1995, at 19.
491 See Foreign Shares Regulations, supra note 472, art. 15.
492 See id. art. 23.
493 See id. arts. 15, 29.
494 See id. arts. 24-26.
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company are to be registered with the company.4 95 The original
copy of the register can be held by and managed by any designated
overseas agent.496 Notice of shareholder's meetings must be given
in writing to all current record shareholders.497
Written replies from shareholders wishing to attend the
meeting must be received at least 21 days before the meeting. 498 A
second public notice to all shareholders must be sent when replies
received amount to less than 50% of the voting rights.
499
Another important shareholder protection feature in the
Foreign Shares Regulations is the specification, in detail, of
directors', supervisory board members', and executive officers'
fiduciary duties,00 including the duty of honesty and the duty of
diligence.5"1 These persons must act honestly and for the benefit of
the company02 and are specifically prohibited from seeking
personal gain from their positions in the company.5 3 Compared
with the similar provision in the B Share Regulations, this
provision sets forth a better and clearer standard.
VII. Analysis
A. Control and Liberalization
In a free economy, securities markets play a vital role in the
formation of capital. They can effectively allocate resources
through competition driven by the supply and demand of capital
resources. 4 Capital flows towards the most profitable enterprises
until a balance is reached between supply and demand."' As a
result, a nation can derive the maximum benefit from its goods and
411 See id. art. 7.
416 See id. art. 17.
497 See id. art 20.
498 See id.
499 See id. art. 22.
500 See id. art. 23.
501 See id.
502 See id.
503 See id.
504 See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
505 See id.
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services.: 6  A healthy, diversified securities market offers
investors greater investment opportunities and leaves a nation's
capital resources unconstricted.5 7
To meet its demand for capital used for economic expansion,
as well as to reform its state enterprises, China has established a
securities system."' Though China is still in transition from a
compulsory socialist central planning system to a so-called
socialist market economy, the ideological framework reflects a
compromise and accommodation of both capitalism and
socialism."9 On the one hand, the mentality associated with
traditional central planning persists, and tight government control
continues with a goal of striving to maintain the dominance of
state ownership. On the other hand, China's "experiment" with
the securities market-a product derived purely from capitalism---
demands liberalization."0 China's tendency towards excessive
control continuously clashes with the demands of liberalization in
the evolution of China's legal framework for its securities market.
Upon examination, it appears obvious that this balance has always
leaned towards the former. Not surprisingly, the development of
the securities market in China has been slow compared to its
economic expansion."
B. Government Control
1. State Share Dominance
For decades, most Chinese enterprises were state-owned and a
small number were collectively-owned."' Even after economic
reform began, the 1982 PRC Constitution called for the leadership
of "state-run" (Guo Ying) enterprises to be supplemented by
506 See id.
507 See Hal. M. Bateman, State Securities Regulation: An Unresolved Dilemma and
a Suggestion for the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759, 761 (1973).
508 See Cao, supra note 14, at 152.
509 See id. at 151-52; see also Qian, supra note 14.
510 See supra notes 504-09 and accompanying text.
511 See Solomon M. Karmel, Securities Markets and China's International
Integration, 49 J. INT'L. AFFAIRS 525, 525 (1996).
512 For an outline of China's state-owned enterprise system, see Johns, supra note
II at 912-14.
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collective and private enterprises. 13  These enterprises were
governed by state central plans and administrative departmental
orders, and did not have any independence or creativity. 14  The
reforms aimed at transforming state enterprises into more self-
sustained independent entities began in the mid-1980s, mainly by
delegating power to the enterprises through contractual agreements
between the enterprises and the government."' In the meantime, a
shareholding system was also explored. 16 To facilitate the state
enterprise reform, the 1993 Constitution amendment replaced the
notion of "state-run" with "state-owned" (Guo You). 517 The
enactment of the Company Law in 1994 indicates that a consensus
on a shareholding system has finally been formed.
The current Chinese enterprise reform is, however,
"corporatization" instead of privatization."' China seems to be
determined to preserve state ownership in the majority of
enterprises.519 It is doing so by transforming the old state
enterprises into stock companies while insuring that the state is the
majority stockholder of the newly established stock companies."2
Thus, the real purpose behind the transformation into a
shareholding system is "revitalizing the state-owned sector as a
513 See XIANFA [PRC CONSTITUTION] (1982), art. 7, translated in LEXIS, World
Library, Chinal File.
514 See Johns, supra note 11, at 912.
515 See Qian, supra note 14, at 74.
516 See id. at 77.
"I See Article Reviews Changes To Constitution: Suggests Further Changes
Possible, BBC WORLD SUMMARY OF BROADCAST, Apr. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File.
518 See Cao, supra note 14; Qian, supra note 14; see also Restructuring China
Does not Seek Privatization in Enterprise Restructuring, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June
20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File (An exclusive interview of the
Vice Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy by Xinhua News
Agency).
519 See Restructuring China Does Not Seek Privatization in Enterprise
Restructuring, supra note 518. In the meantime, China has also taken steps to sell some
small, money-losing state enterprises to private sectors. See id. See also Shanghai to
Sell Off Thirty Small State-Owned Enterprises, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 24, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File. But as a whole, the state-owned sector
is strengthened, not weakened, because the state capital will be concentrated in the large
companies. See Restructuring China Does not Seek Privatization in Enterprise
Restructuring, supra note 518.
520 See Cao, supra note 14, at 159.
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whole" and ensuring that "the state-owned sector will play a
leading role in China's economy" by taking advantage of the
capital provided by the private investors, who would become the
minority shareholders.52'
The state majority ownership policy has had a profound effect
on China's shareholding system and securities market. To ensure
the state's majority status, stock shares are classified by the
identity of the shareholders. The shares held by the state are not
on the market and their transfer is restricted.522 The trading of legal
person shares (shares of a state company held by another entity) is
also limited.5 23  Although trading is allowed, it is restricted
between organization holders within the STAQ and NETS, the two
small electronic trading networks.524 Furthermore, the limited
number of shares reserved for foreign investors is divided by
national borders.525 Thus, a majority of the shares issued are
excluded from the secondary market. Naturally, the liquidity of
the fragmented markets is severely limited, and the ability of the
markets to self-adjust leads to great volatility.526
In order to increase the efficiency of resource allocation
through the securities market, China must improve the liquidity of
its markets, reduce its volatility, and maintain investor confidence.
Small, fragmented markets should be merged. Even if China is
presently unwilling to give up state dominance, legal person shares
should be open to individual investors.
In addition, under the current shareholding system,
maximization of productivity and profitability may not always be
achieved. First, the state has majority ownership-it has control
over the policies and personnel of the companies. The state,
having to balance the interests of all the parties it controls, may
sacrifice a particular company's profitability to achieve other state
521 Restructuring China Does Not Seek Privatization in Enterprise Restructuring,
supra note 518.
522 See supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
523 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
524 See Fang, supra note 35, at 208-10.
525 B share markets are separate from the H and N share markets. For a description
of these shares, see supra notes 409-11.
526 See Cao, supra note 14, at 164-65.
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objectives. 27  In addition, state shares are administered or
controlled by ministries and commissions of the central or local
governments. 28  Many of these administrative agencies were
traditionally the direct supervising body of the trade or industry. 29
Excessive administrative interference in the management of
the companies is inevitable."' Such intervention may be
motivated by traditional central planning mentality, agency policy
judgment, priority preferences, or even abuse of discretion by
government agencies. China is considering establishing
independent holding companies to manage state shares and to
break the link between government agencies and state-owned
companies. 3' Even in such a system, directors representing state
shares, without personal holdings of the company, may not have
enough incentive to perform their duties diligently. A holding
company system would create another challenge for China's
reformers: invent means to ensure that holding company officials
act responsibly for the benefit of state shareholders. Ultimately,
such holding companies would be controlled by a state
government agency.
State majority ownership prevents the maximization of
productivity and profitability of a company in yet another aspect.
Because state shares are often the controlling shares, hostile
takeovers are practically impossible. Thus, the outside pressure on
directors and management to operate the company efficiently is
eliminated.32
To protect shareholders' interest and increase investors'
527 See Matthew D. Latimer, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusion of
Shareholder Rights in China, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1097 (1994).
528 See Fang, supra note 35, at 229.
529 See id.
530 See id; see also Jiansheng Hu, Lun Guoyou Qiye de Gufenzhi Gaizao [On
Shareholding Reform of State-Owned Enterprises], 2 Zhengfa Luntan [Forum on
Politics and Law] 33 (1995). Nevertheless, China is also trying to reduce such
government interference and the pace of reform may be quickened in the future. See
Xiqing Gao, The Perceived Unreasonable Man--A Response to Fang Liufang, 5 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 271, at 286.
531 See China Law Aims at State-Asset Management, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, June
12, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
532 See David Hu, Financial Reform and Corporate Governance in China, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 469, 477-79 (1996).
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confidence, it is crucial for laws and regulations to detail specific
rules for corporate governance and provide adequate protection for
shareholders, especially the minority shareholders.533 Although the
Company Law, the B Share Regulations, and the Foreign Share
Provisions do provide several articles holding directors,
supervisory board members, and executive officers accountable,534
clearly defined rules, standards, and procedures for enforcement
should be prescribed, for China is not a common law country and
there is no precedent a court can follow. In addition, provisions
that impose fiduciary duties on majority shareholders towards the
minority shareholders should be supplied. This is particularly
important when the state is always the unshakable majority. In
addition, securities regulations should provide rules for
shareholder proxy contests to allow minority shareholders to
submit legitimate proposals for shareholder consideration. In
summary, granting more rights to shareholders would allow them
to exercise a meaningful degree of oversight over the management
of their companies and increase their confidence in the securities
system. This would not only increase the efficiency of the
securities market, but would also help to standardize company
governance and facilitate the economic reform process.
2. The Quota System
The quota system, a product of a socialist central planning
system, has been maintained throughout the history of China's
securities market. It has been the central element in both the bond
and stock issuing processes, reflecting the government's tight
control over the market. 35 Quotas have been a major barrier to
organizing companies and issuing shares. 36 In essence, the supply
and demand mechanism in a free market is replaced by the quota
system.537 It is true that the government could achieve its
533 See generally Nikkel, supra note 192 (discussing protection of shareholders'
interests).
534 See Company Law, supra note 2 1, arts. 59-63, 111, 118, 123.
535 See supra notes 122-27, 208-10, 437-38 and accompanying text.
536 See Fang, supra note 35, at 265.
537 See, e.g., Sophie Roell, China, Reining in The Free Market, EUROMONEY, July
31, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. In distributing quotas and
selecting companies for listing, the central government five-year plans and other
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economic policy by distributing quotas to a priority company or
industry."' The lesson drawn from China's planned economy
before the reform, however, is that government planning can never
achieve an efficiency comparable to that derived from a free
market. The quota system deprives the market of the efficient
allocation of capital resources. In addition, it can drastically affect
the liquidity of the market by limiting the scale of the total offer.
Curiously, the Company Law makes no mention of quotas. 39
This omission may indicate a shift towards less control and more
liberalization.
3. Issuing Approval Procedures and Qualifications
Another aspect of excessive government control is reflected in
the application, examination, and approval process required to
issue stocks or bonds. 4°  Substantial transaction costs are
inevitable when applicants have to go through multi-level
government agencies. In addition, the qualifications required for
issuing companies are overly high. They must have a substantial
amount of net capital and must have been profitable.14' These
strict requirements effectively narrow the eligible companies to a
few large state enterprises. Indeed, this may have been the
underlying policy consideration. These criteria may protect
investors and maintain investors' confidence. Smaller companies,
however, also have greater need for capital; and many could be
promising. In addition, the criteria should be lowered to allow
non-state companies to raise capital on the securities market.
These fast-growing private, quasi-private, collective, and foreign-
invested enterprises are the engines for entrepreneurial innovation
and growth and have been largely responsible for China's
exponential economic expansion. 42 Listing these shares would not
only spur further economic growth, but would also create healthy
development objectives play a key role. See id. The investment bank's role has been
replaced by the State Planning Commission and the CSRC. See id.
538 See Roell, nhat Does the Future Hold, supra note 135, at 18.
539 In fact, the Company Law requires approval if the application conforms to the
requirements specified therein. See Company Law, supra note 21, art. 86.
540 See supra notes 127-34, 208-13, 446-56, 488 and accompanying text.
541 See supra notes 141-43, 211-15, 442,443-45 and accompanying text.
542 See Cao, supra note 14, at 175.
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competition for state companies. Moreover, it would increase
investors' confidence by attracting more investors and would
improve the liquidity of the market.
C. Weak Regulatory Enforcement
Ironically, in contrast to the tight state control of security
issuance, the regulatory framework for the secondary market has
been quite ineffective. Although national rules and regulations
have been in place for some time, they have not been enforced
effectively. 4 1 Consequently, violations of the rules are prevalent
in the securities market.544
Based on the experience of the United States in securities
regulation,5 45 to maintain an orderly securities market, two features
must exist: (1) clearly defined and integrated rules and regulations;
and (2) an administrative agency that is independent and possesses
broad enforcement and rulemaking power.5 46  In regulating the
secondary market, China has adopted a policy similar to that of the
United States547  in its regulatory framework--requiring
information disclosure and prohibiting fraud and manipulation.
48
Yet, the regulatory machine has not run smoothly in its six-year
history. Violations are common and market volatility is great.549
The performance of the securities market has not been
543 See Roell, China, Reining, supra note 537.
544 See id.
545 In the United States, the purpose behind the securities regulatory framework is
to protect investors against fraud and increase investor confidence. The US has taken an
approach based primarily on mandatory information disclosure and prohibition of fraud.
See S. REP NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933).
546 The federal securities laws include both the Congressional statute, SEC rules,
general statements issued by the SEC and self-regulatory organizations, and reports of
decided cases. See DAVID L. RATNER, THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS 15-19 (4th ed. 1991). The SEC has broad rulemaking power
authorized by Congress. In addition, it has jurisdiction over virtually anyone dealing
with stocks. It has over 2,000 staff, most of whom are lawyers. See id. at 13-14.
547 See supra notes 318-404 and accompanying text.
548 See supra notes 318-404 and accompanying text.
549 See China's Securities Markets: Still In Experiment Stage, Dow JONES
INTERNATIONAL NEWS, June 29, 1995, available in Westlaw, Farnews Database.
Information disclosure is inadequate. Many listed companies failed to submit financial
reports to the CSRC. See Roell, China, Reining, supra note 537.
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satisfactory."'
The CSRC, gradually moving to the center of China's
securities market, is the equivalent of the SEC in the United
States.55 Initially, it was granted supervisory and regulatory
powers over the securities market.552 Such powers, however, have
been limited in many aspects. Unlike in the United States, where
the securities industry was unregulated before the SEC was
established, China's securities institutions and fragmented rules
existed before the CSRC was organized.553 Various parts of the
industry were controlled by different government bodies.54 While
the PBOC controlled overall regulatory function, institutions were
established through local efforts.555 Thus, local government also
had control. 56 In addition, the central planning system in China
gave rise to a formidable web of government bureaucratic agencies
at both local and central levels.557 Essentially, each individual
enterprise was subject to overlapping administrative controls by
multiple government agencies.5 Thus, it is no surprise that
bureaucratic turf wars between agencies at the same or different
levels are routine.
Unlike the SEC, the CSRC has been tied up by this
550 See generally Karmel, supra note 511 (discussing China's secondary securities
market).
551 See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
552 See Fang, supra note 35, at 174.
553 See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
554 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
555 For example, both national exchanges were established by local governments
under local rules. See Potter, supra note 30.
556 See id.
557 For a sample list of such agencies, see Notice Concerning the Organic
Establishment of The State Council, issued by the State Council on Aug. 13, 1988,
translation available in LEXIS, World Library, Chinal File. Just at the central
government level, under the cabinet, the State Council, there were forty-two ministries
and commissions, nineteen bureaus, five administration offices, fifteen State Bureaus,
and five Institutions.
558 For an example, per tradition, a central level enterprise in the chemical business
is directly controlled by the Chemical Engineering Ministry in the central government
and must report to the Ministry. The Ministry is responsible for the operations of the
enterprise, like a parent for a child. Thus, if the enterprise violates securities law, the
CSRC will likely meet resistance from the Ministry.
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bureaucratic in-fighting."9 After the establishment of the SCSC
and the CSRC, the PBOC remained responsible for issuing
licenses and permits to securities institutions, including securities
brokers and dealers . 6' Thus, while the CSRC can fine brokers, it
possesses no power to revoke their licenses.56" ' The Finance
Ministry retained the power to issue treasury bonds and the CSRC
was not explicitly given the authority over bond futures
transactions until February 1995.562 In addition, because local
governments in Shanghai and Shenzhen were instrumental in
establishing securities exchanges and listing companies on the
exchanges, they too were reluctant to transfer power to the
CSRC.563  Other ministries in charge of different trades and
business have resisted the CSRC's directives.
64
Bureaucratic turf wars have also hampered the CSRC's
regulatory efforts5 65 and the healthy development of the securities
market because they have made effective enforcement of laws
virtually impossible, leaving the market inadequately regulated. In
an unregulated securities market, market violations and
vacillations are prevalent, and irregularities and market crashes
can occur through a causal chain: fraud and similar misconduct
leads to speculation, which, aggravated by market manipulation,
559 See Roell, What Does the Future Hold, supra note 135.
560 See Potter, supra note 30.
561 See Arbitration Compulsory in Chinese Stock Disputes, STRAIGHT TIMES, Oct.
15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, AlIwid File.
562 One example of the CSRC's frustration is reflected in its dealings with the bonds
futures market. It was reluctant to intervene in the 1995 bond futures market that was
battered by violations and over-speculation, for fear of offending the Finance Ministry.
Only after the so called "327 Scandal" broke out was it given the explicit authority. See
id. See also Provisional Procedures for the Management of Treasury Bond Futures
Transactions (issued by the CSRC and the Finance Ministry in Feb. 1995), supra note
267, art. 5 (new bond futures regulation issued after the 327 scandal giving the CSRC
authority).
563 See, e.g., Shenzhen Government Says Securities Administration Regulates
Bourse, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Aug. 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Farnews
Database.
56 See Roell, What Does the Future Hold, supra note 135, at 19.
565 See Roell, China, Reining, supra note 537. The former CSRC general counsel
complained: "Often we can't afford to offend other government agencies. Because if we
offend the PBOC or ministry of finance, then they'll make life difficult for us. So we
have to try to negotiate." See id.
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results in irregularities, volatilities, and/or market crashes . 66
Consequently, investors lose confidence in the market and, as a
result, the securities system fails.
Thus, it is imperative that the CSRC's authority be broadened
and the scope of its power be more clearly defined.167 There have
been signs that the CSRC is finally gaining more control.16' New
national securities laws should be passed to make the CSRC an
independent agency with broad adjudicatory, rulemaking, and
policy making authority. The CSRC should be granted
jurisdiction over all institutions and individuals involved in the
securities market. It should be equipped with a qualified staff and
modem technology.5 69 At the same time, a detailed judicial review
procedure should be implemented for the courts to properly limit
the CSRC's power within the scope granted until the securities
regulations are fully enforced. An orderly, efficient market cannot
be achieved otherwise.
V1I1. Conclusion
After more than a decade of experimenting with a market
economy, securities markets and a regulatory framework have
emerged in China. Both the bond and stock markets have
generated urgently needed funds for economic development. The
capital resource allocation process, however, is far from efficient.
At the core of the problem is the need for China to strike an
appropriate balance between control and liberalization. Excessive
state control of the primary market-whether by administrative
intervention in the market or through the dominance of state
ownership-has been a standard practice in China's securities
system and hinders the healthy development of the nation's
566 See Fitz Gibbon, What Is a Security? A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to
Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893, 914-15 (1980) (describing
the mechanism of the 1929 market crash).
567 In fact, the status of the current CSRC is uncertain. Commentators have even
questioned the constitutionality of the SCSC and CSRC. See Fang, supra note 35, at
174-78.
568 See China: CSRC Sections to Be Overhauled, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May
30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (The CSRC will be further
strengthened by giving it some of the powers of the PBOC).
569 As of 1994, there were only 130 staff members, 40-50 of whom were actually
doing the job. See Roell, China, Reining, supra note 537.
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markets. In addition, the history of the market has shown the
weaknesses of regulatory enforcement by the CSRC.
China must loosen its tight state control of the primary market,
while at the same time reinforce the regulation of the secondary
market. In the treasury bonds market, with the open market
operation of the central bank and other major reform, China is
moving towards less administrative control and a more market-
oriented system. In the stock market, further meaningful reform is
needed to spur development. Even within the state majority
ownership framework, liquidity can be improved by merging
fragmented markets and loosening the quota and approval
requirements to allow more good companies to participate in the
market. Increasing shareholder protections and strengthening the
authority of the CSRC are essential to protect investors and
maintain an orderly market. The Interim Regulations on Stock
Issuance and Trading are outdated in many aspects and are
inconsistent with many other laws and regulations in the
regulatory scheme. A unified national securities law with precise
rules reflecting an appropriate balance between control and
liberalization is essential for China's securities market to prosper
in the coming century.
JAY ZHE ZHANGt
t The author would like to dedicate this article to Ms. Haiying Lu for her endless
support.
630 [Vol. 22
